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Abstract 
 The risk matrix has been used by safety professionals for many years as a significant tool 
for hazard management, risk assessment and prioritization, and to aid in offering a proactive 
approach to prevent negative outcomes. However, relative risk matrix assessments do not provide 
enough required variety to understand the complete picture necessary in complex systems of work; 
it merely explains definite type of hazards and their counter measures in isolation. Moreover, 
application of a linear causal relationship to recognize hazards creates an extensive attention to 
negative outcomes and lower level of controls, limiting stakeholder involvement and cross 
disciplinary engagement. Question sets inspired by the Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) have been applied to understand if an alternative approach offers a more effective means 
of risk assessment, and thus is of greater value to both the stakeholders and the organization. Only 
one research study has been performed to illustrate if the new methods proposed in recent years 
(Resilience Engineering, FRAM, etc.) are applicable in industries. Albery et al., (2016) developed 
a new methodology as part of his dissertation in order to study the application of the new methods 
in a manufacturing environment. In view of that, this research investigates whether Albery’s 
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 The word “safe” means that an outcome of an action will be as it expected. In other 
words, safety is an outcome of a system when all the actions which are under taken or will be 
taken go right and meet success. But paradoxically, we assess and measure safety by counting 
the tasks and actions which went wrong (Hollnagel, 2014). It is the critical point that the 
difference of Safety-I and Safety-II emerges. The idea of safety as a “Dynamic non-event” 
introduced for the first time by Professor Karl Weick (1987) in California Management Review, 
defines it as “Reliability is an ongoing condition in which problems are momentarily under 
control due to compensating changes in components.” This definition can smoothly express the 
current approach to safety that provides the underlying elements of this research. The distinction 
between, and definitions of Safety-I and Safety-II are critically important to this research and 
will be elaborated on in the literature review, but are best summed by Hollnagel, 2014, pg. 134) 
as follows: 
 “Just as Safety-I is defined as a condition where as little as possible went wrong, Safety-
II is defined as a condition where as much as possible goes right, indeed preferably as a 
condition where everything goes right.  In analogy with resilience, Safety-II can also be defined 
as the ability to succeed under expected and unexpected conditions alike, so that the number of 
intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible.”  
  A risk matrix as a hazard assessment tool has been used in industries for many years in 
order to (i) document the hidden hazards, (ii) proactively reduce and prevent negative 
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consequences. The main purpose of a risk assessment is to determine whether the level of the 
risks that are associated with the work activities are acceptable, or are in a level that needs more 
controls in order to lower risk to an acceptable level. The process of the risk assessment should 
be rational, logical and structured while performing a systematic comparison of different risk 
control options so that the best decision can be made. The risk assessment process can be divided 
into three stages: (Gadd, Keeley, & Balmforth, 2004) 
• Preparing for the assessment; 
• Carrying out the assessment; 
• Post-assessment activities. 
Although the distinctions between the three stages are not simply practicable, it can provide a 
guiding framework that should be considered through the process. Moreover, the linear causal 
relationship for describing the hazards emphasizes only the negative consequences and lower 
order controls that limit stakeholder learning and cross disciplinary engagement (Cox, 2008). 
Numerous research studies have been performed in the risk assessment area, and a substantial 
number of them illustrate the weaknesses and misconceptions about hazard assessment tools.   
Only one study illustrates the new method of identification and recognition of the hazards within 
the today’s complicated socio-technical systems. Albery et al. (2016) has demonstrated how to 
apply the new method of thinking, a Safety-II perspective, in hazard identification and 
assessment by recently proposed technique called Functional Resonance Analysis Method, or 
FRAM. The challenge of Safety-I prototype, replacing it with the perspective of Safety-II and 
essentially foresee the isolated hazard management in order to optimize the greater system have 
been proposed by Albery et al., (2016). This research aimed to investigate the validity and 
applicability of this newly proposed risk assessment tool in a different manufacturing 
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environment where hidden hazards are not recognizable by linear risk assessment methods and 
using a tool with greater requisite variety may mitigate them.   
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) provides a new technique to 
understand if a new approach to safety can provide a more effective risk assessment. In fact, 
FRAM is a tool with greater requisite variety to mitigate the hazards associated with linear risk 
assessment methods (Hollnagel, (CRC), & Cedex, 2013). In the FRAM approach, the entire 
system is considered in addition to the recognized hazards and their counter measures by 
assessing safety and productivity in one activity. This approach to risk assessment is in contrast 
with the Safety-I perspective of risk assessment that uses risk matrix assessments with only 
hazards and their controls in isolation. FRAM perspective delivers a more comprehensive 
assessment of the system by using sets of questions with identification of higher controls through 
collaboration with all stakeholders.  
 The research evaluated four work systems within an electrical equipment manufacturing 
environment. The systems were selected based on two main characteristics key to both Safety-II 
and FRAM assessments, these characteristics are as being (Albery, Borys, & Tepe, 2016): 
 variability in functions,  
 the level of control on the variability,  
 the couplings between functions within the systems, as well as couplings to 
upstream and downstream systems.  
 
The objectives of the research are set in order to create a learning cycle (Aygris, 1999), 
firstly to understand how work was imagined and performed in each of the systems were 
selected, and secondly to evaluate and compare learnings from risk matrix and FRAM based 
approaches (Albery et al., 2016). 
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 Four sets of questions were employed as means of risk assessment in order to obtain 
required information regarding to the objectives of the research which are as below: 
 To understand how the work has been described and how it has been performing in four 
different work systems in a manufacturing environment. 
 To evaluate and compare the learnings from risk matrix and FRAM based approaches of 
risk assessments. 
The construction of the FRAM model is not reflected in this paper as it is another full project 
and it is not in the scope of this research, however it would be another area of interest to expand. 
 
Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 The Three Concerns with Safety 
 
2.1.1 The Need for Safety 
Hollnagel (2014) in his “Safety-I and Safety-II, the Past and the Future of Safety” has 
explored the roots of word “Safety” and its meanings through history. The word “Safety” is an 
Old French word sauf, which sequentially comes from the Latin word salvus. The meaning of 
sauf is ‘uninjured’ or ‘unharmed’, while the meaning of salvus is ‘uninjured’, ‘healthy’, or ‘safe’. 
The current definition of “Safe” with the meaning of “not being exposed to danger” goes back to 
fourteenth century while it was first recorded in 1580s as an adjective to typify actions. The word 
“Safety” has being used since then frequently in different contexts and it is instantaneously 
meaningful to us. The assumption that everyone knows and understands what safety means is so 
prevalent in many documents, standards and even doctoral theses and because of it, no one 
bothers him/herself to define the word “Safety”. For instance, commonly used expressions such 
as ‘have a safe flight’ conveys the meaning that we hope the journey with the airplane will take 
place without any unwanted or unexpected events (Hollnagel, 2014).  
In general, when the outcome of an event is as expected or wanted, the event is called 
‘Safe’. In other words, when things go right and the outcomes are successful, the actions are 
being taken safely. Unfortunately, in many cases we are not aware of successful actions or how 
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often things go right. On the opposite side, we have a proper understanding about the things went 
wrong or at least we have an idea about the unsuccessful actions (Hollnagel, 2014). 
In the field of safety management systems, the focus is commonly on avoiding unsuccessful 
events instead of studying around the actions go right as are expected every day. Although it 
would be logical to focus on the positive aspects of events rather than on the absence of them, 
but in the real world safety is being practice otherwise (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The need to be free from hazards is psychologically driven from the desire that humans 
want to achieve the goals as are planned. Humans need to be free from harm to survive. There 
are many kinds of doubt and uncertainty that are out of control or unexplainable, while the 
willing to make some rationales always exists. Ibn Hazm (944-1064), who was one of the 
leading thinkers of the Islam, mentioned to the fact that the dominant drive of all human actions 
is the desire to avoid anxiety. Indeed, he declared that the main reason to interpret safety as the 
absence of harm is a psychological need (Hollnagel, 2014). 
2.1.2 Safety as a Dynamic Non-event 
 Professor Karl Weick (1987) introduced the concept of reliability as a dynamic non-event 
for the first time in an article in California Management Review. 
 
“Reliability is dynamic in the sense that it is an ongoing condition in which problems 
are momentarily under control due to compensating changes in components. 
Reliability is invisible in at least two ways. First, people often don’t know how 
many mistakes they could have made but didn’t, which means they have at best 
only a crude idea of what produces reliability and how reliable they are. […] 
Reliability is also invisible in the sense that reliable outcomes are constant, which 




The definition of reliability as a dynamic non-event has often been paraphrased to define 
safety. The phrase “the freedom from unacceptable risk” in fact presents whether a system is safe 
or not. “Dynamic” means that the outcome (of the non-event) cannot be assured, while the 
definition of “non-event” is that the event does not happen or has not happened (Hollnagel, 
2014). Hollnagel (2014) has mentioned to this issue that although defining safety as a dynamic 
non-event is clever, but the problem evolves where non-events have to be detected or even be 
noticed. He explained the issue, being impossible to count non-events, by providing some day-
to-day routine instances such as how many times we are not injured at work or did not cause 
harm at work? How many times we did not do something wrong or make a mistake? How many 
cyclists or pedestrians – or cats or dogs – we did not hit when we drove home from work? 
A more realistic example of it can be found in traffic safety numbers. Every year 
authorities release statistics in traffic safety. The numbers present how many people have been 
killed or how many accidents happened from the year before, while none of them states the 
number of people have not killed in traffic. “Dagen H” is a quiet unique instance of the situation 
where non-events have been counted. In Sweden driving from left-hand side changed to driving 
on the right-hand side on September 1967. It was regulated that non-essential traffic is banned 
from 01:00 to 06:00 and any vehicle has to stop completely at 4:50 and then cautiously move to 
the other side of the road and remain there till 05:00 when the prohibition is lifted. Since there 
was no traffic, or at least a very small amount of traffic which could be monitored, it can be 
ensured that there were no non-events during the transition. And because there were no non-
events, there will not be any events either, so no accidents would happen (Hollnagel, 2014). 
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It might be feasible to consider safety as a dynamic event; the event is now should be the things 
go right. Consequently, the non-event becomes the things go wrong and that would be possible 
to count as we have done normally (Hollnagel, 2014).  
 
2.1.3 Measurement of Safety 
The need to demonstrate the presence of safety quantitatively is demanded by both 
society and industry. Safety should be demonstrated in a way that different individuals explain or 
experience it in such a manner that they can confirm each other. Safety statistics are a common 
practice to demonstrate safety (or “unsafety”). A well-known instance of general safety statistics 
is a list compiled by Bernard Cohen, Professor Emeritus of Physics at the University of 
Pittsburgh.  The list that is shown in Table 1 below illustrates different activities that are 
associated with the same level of risk. In other words, activities with the same level of risk are in 
the same row (Hollnagel, 2014). 
Table 1 -  Various activities with the same level of risk (Hollnagel, 2014) 
Spend three hours in a coal mine (risk of 
having an accident). 
Travel 10 miles by bicycle (risk of 
having an accident). 
Travel 300 miles car (risk of having an 
accident). 
Travel 1,000 miles by jet air-plane (risk 
of having an accident). 
Smoke 1.4 cigarettes. Live two months 
with a smoker. 
Eat 100 charcoal-broiled steaks. Drink 30 
cans saccharine soda. 
Live 20 years near PVC plant (cancer from 
vinyl chloride). 
Live 150 years at 20 miles from a nuclear 
power plant. 
Live two months in Denver (cancer from 
high average radiation). 
Live five miles from nuclear plant for 50 
years (nuclear accident). 
 
 When quantifying safety by measuring when things go wrong, a paradoxical situation 
arises. The irony is that the less things go wrong, the less will be to measure. Consequently, 
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when a system is perfectly safe – assuming that it would be meaningful or possible – there will 
be nothing to measure. In other words, when a source of information is eliminated, the possibility 
of regulating or managing is reduced.  An example of this paradox would be the Single European 
Sky ATM Research or SESAR program for building the future European air traffic management 
system. One of the four targets of the program is to enhance safety by a factor of 10. This 
enhancement is recognized by a drop in the number of reported accidents or incidents, where the 
further improvement will be either harder or slower (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
2.2 History of Safety 
 
2.2.1 Safety Through Ages 
The development of safety can be described with development of rationales of the 
“causes” of accidents and also “mechanisms” of accidents. The “causes” can be explained by 
socially accepted roots or reasons of why accidents happen and the “mechanisms” refer to the 
ways that how an accident happened. Therefore, the thinking about the causes has directly related 
to the notion of causality and to failure. Although the two, causes and mechanisms, are not 
completely independent, the development in the thinking about “causes” has not been 
harmonized with the development of thinking about “mechanisms”. The set of probable causes 
presents the changes in the technologies being used plus the systems being employed. The 
change in the nature of causes demonstrates the changes in what the components of the systems 
are. For instance, the changes from entirely technical systems, such as steam engines, towards 
socio-technical systems like train dispatch centers. Clearly, if no steam engine exists, the 
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mechanical hazards will be at zero; or the chance of the trains’ collision would not be a concern 
if the train transportation system has not been developed (Hollnagel, 2014).  
The initial point of safety, for the entire history of it, has been the occurrence of an 
unexpected event, whether it is an accident, an incident or even been categorized as a risk or 
hazard. Generally, new types of hazards have been introduced by new types of causes (for 
instances, metal fatigue, software failure or organizational failure), instead of challenging the 
basic primary assumption of causality. Since, humans have the partial desire to simplify 
explanations and single type causality, the development of one major type of cause had been 
dominated rather than the combination or consideration of all hazards together. The advantage of 
single type causality is the elimination of the need to consider the dependency or interactions 
between all the potential causes, which results in the single cause-effect relationship dominant 
type hazard explanation. Recently, it has been found necessary to change the perception of single 
cause-effect relationship, not only about the possible causes, but also the way they generate 
effects. It means that the notion of causality in the traditional way no longer explains events in 
the format of simple malfunctioning of a component or multiple components. In other words, the 
reason may be a condition or situation that only occurred momentary, but long enough to disturb 
some of the future actions or activities. (Hollnagel, 2014) 
Safety has advanced and evolved through three ages, the first ‘’Technical Age”, the 
second “Human Factors Age” and the third “Management Systems Age,” (Hale, A. R., & 
Hovden, J., 1998). Glenden et al. (2006) have mentioned that each age is built on the age before 
and does not leave any one of those ages behind.  These ages are important to this research 
because they enlighten the path where safety should be monitored in order to provide more 
effective solutions to the protection of current complicated socio-technical systems. 
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2.2.1.1 The Technical Age: 
The first age refers to the period of time when most concerns surrounding the technology 
itself and also the people that had not learned how to guard against the risks. At this age, 
technologies were considered particularly unreliable and the main concern was to find technical 
means to guard machineries, prevent explosion, and structural collapse. Despite the fact that the 
necessity of reliable equipment in every industry still exists, the need for reliability analysis 
became widespread after the end of World War-II. One reason was the increasing demand of 
maintenance and repair of military equipment during the war, and the second reason was the 
technological and scientific improvements that provided new openings for creating more 
complicated technical systems. Particularly, improvement in digital computers, control theory, 
information theory, and the inventions of the transistor and the integrated circuit created the 
advanced opportunities of productivity in which the systems became more and more difficult to 
understand. So, it challenged the human ability to both on understanding inside of the systems 
and also to manage them. Both Civilian and military domains experienced a rapid growth in 
terms of scope and performance of the technical systems in this age, when it caused the need of 
methods to address the safety and risk of these systems. Methods such as Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) or Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEA) or Hazard and Operability Analysis 
(HAZOP) were developed not just to analyze possible causes of hazards, but also to prevent risk 
and hazards before a system was taken into the operation (Hollnagel, 2014). 
2.2.1.2 The Human Factor Age: 
On 28 March 1979, at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant, the disaster 
happened and the notion that the mastery of all the sources of risks can effectively manage safety 
of the system dissolved. Before it, the consensus had been that the implementation of methods 
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such as FMEA, FTA or HAZOP can guarantee the safety of the nuclear power plants. The 
second age is based on the concept that the established hazard assessment methods that have 
been mentioned above would not be sufficient for ensuring the safety of high risk organizations 
similar to nuclear power plants. After this disaster, it was clearly obvious that there is a missing 
aspect called “Human Factor”. It began to consider human aspect, “human error”, in the existing 
methods (FMEA, FTA, etc.) but shortly these methods were replaced by more developed 
methods such as Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) that became established as the standard 
analysis for nuclear power plant safety. The notion that “human error” could be a logical tool to 
describe the occurrence of failures was willingly adopted by other industries, and the growth of 
models and methods quickly increased (Hollnagel, 2014). 
2.2.1.3 The Management Systems Age: 
Although the transition from the second age to the third was less dramatic than the first 
transition to the second, two main reasons can readily describe it. The first reason was that 
addressing safety and health concerns could be provided by approached such as human factors 
engineering and Human–Machine Interaction design. The second reason was that the methods 
like HRA (Human Reliability Analysis) and many “human error” methods were not satisfactory 
due to their limitation. Accidents such as the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster and the 
explosion of reactor number four at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which both occurred in 
1986, made it clear that the organization had to be considered over and above the human factor. 
The third age, which is still in the transition from the second age, attempts to include the 
organizational factors in the linear causality paradigm. The organizational factors are commonly 
less straightforward than human factors (humans can be seen in the models as part of machines 
that work like an artificial mind but for the organizational factors it will not be a case). 
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“Organizational accidents” or “organizational failures” are seen as equivalent to technical 
failures, just as human failures were in the aftermath of the TMI (Three Mile Island) disaster. 
Evidently, it is an extreme simplification to look at organizations and humans as “factors” and 
adequately address them by methods that follow the principles developed to deal with technical 
problems (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
2.2.2 The Current State of Safety – Safety-I 
 The American National Standards Institute (ANSI)  (ANSI Z10, 2012) defines safety as 
the freedom from unacceptable risk, while unacceptable risk is defined as a risk with a high 
probability. This definition relates to the traditional definition of safety which refers to the 
conditions where nothing goes wrong. Although the feasibility of being 100% certain what is 
going to happen is very low, but being safe means that the likelihood that something can go 
wrong is acceptably small. In correspond to human activity it makes a good sense to just focus 
on things go wrong, since such situations are by definition unexpected and they may lead to 
unwanted harm or loss of property (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 One of the consequences of associating safety with things that go wrong is an absence of 
attention to things that go right, which is unintentional and inevitable. The main reason would be 
practical limitations in terms of time and effort, which means that it is impossible to pay 
attention to everything. The gradual and involuntary reduction in respond to a frequent 
incitement is known as habituation. Habituation is very common and normal – William James: 
“Habitual actions are certain, and being in no danger of going astray from their end, need no 
extraneous help”. It means that things go well because the system works well as it should. While 
it is logical to accept few difference between outcomes but it would be totally fatal to paying no 
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attention to all actions of a system since the concept of habituation makes a lot of sense 
(Hollnagel, 2014). 
 Hollnagel (2014) described how things work by two new statements, “Work-As-Done” 
and “Work-As-Imagined”. Work-as-done refers to how work is done in a work place, such as 
hospital ward, an aircraft cockpit, a production line, a supermarket, etc. It is also called the 
“Sharp end”, the situation in which work is performed and the consequences of actions show 
themselves straightly. The other end of work is the “Blunt end”, situations and activities that 
effect directly or indirectly the conditions where the work at the sharp end takes place. It is called 
“Work-As-Imagined”. Work-as-imagined is made up by the people who have controls on the 
constraints and resources - like policy makers, directors, managers, designers, etc. - effecting 
personnel, equipment and general conditions of work at the sharp end.  
 Frederick Winslow Taylor, an American engineer, introduced the Scientific Management 
Theory early in 1900’s. According to Scientific Management Theory, an analysis of tasks and 
activities could function as the foundation for improving work efficiency. The scientific and 
engineering developments of twentieth century created a significant reliability on technology 
leading to established the belief that this degree of reliability can be achieved by human and to a 
stronger degree by organizational systems. This theory constitutes the notion that the work-as-
imagined establishes the necessary and sufficient basis for safe and effective work. In other 
words, a safe environment, or in general safety, could be ensured by constructing a precise 
working instruction and comprehensive training. According to this way of thinking, reduction or 
removal of performance variability by implementing the rules of Scientific Management Theory 
can help to maintain efficiency and eliminate malfunctions and failures, either by standardizing 
work or by constraining all types of performance variability (Hollnagel, 2014). 
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 The outcome of a system can be categorized as either failure or success. It can be 
justifiable for a given person or a group as either acceptable or unacceptable, but cannot be both 
(Hollnagel, 2014). 
 The statistics in figure 1 below illustrate the ratio of 1:10,000 that is the number of 
failures to successes in an organization or a system. It means in an organization or a system one 
action out of 10,000 actions being performed is failed and the rest, 9999, have been performed as 
they were expected. The currently perspective in safety illustrates that the number of failures 
should remain as low as reasonably possible, by providing a system to ensure that the work is 
being performed as it imagined (prescribed), in order to call an organization safe or not safe. In 
other words, the only focus is on the left side of ratio and there is no attention to the large 
success’ number. Hollnagel (2014) titled this way of thinking as “Safety-I” or the traditional 
perspective in safety which is illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1- Comparing the number of things go right and things go wrong (Hollnagel, et al., 2014) 
 
The Ratio of Failure to Success
1-10-4: = 9,999 
successes in
10,000 actions






Figure 2 - Philosophy of Safety-I (Hollnagel, 2014) 
  
There are two ways to control operations in the vantage point of Safety-I. These two 
ways are assumed to be different. The aim of safety management is to maintain systems in the 
first state, which is desired outcomes, by applying these two approaches. The first one is to 
“finding errors” when something has gone wrong and then try to fix the error. Hollnagel (2014) 
has named it “find and fix” approach. The second way for Safety-I to achieve its goals is to 
preventing the transitions from “normal” “abnormal” states. This way is possible, if it is, merely 
by controlling the performance variability. In real sense, there should be numerous types of 
barriers in order to limit the variability happens in every day work, e.g. physical and functional 
barriers, interlocks and even symbolic barriers. These approaches to safety are clearly reactive 
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2.3 The Figments of Safety-I 
 This section discusses a number of very common assumptions in safety. Since they are 
only assumptions based on some common beliefs and they are not facts, they will not be 
verifiable. Six major safety figments will be argued based on their occurrence frequency in order 
to propose an alternative view.  
 
2.3.1 Human Error  
In Safety-I perspective the largest single cause of accidents and incidents is “Human 
error”. Human error is still the fundamental focus of numerous accident investigation models and 
for sure one of the very basic of human reliability assessments. The concept of human error as 
part of the safety lore became predominant while technology and equipment improved rapidly in 
1900’s. The famous accident investigation model, dominos, proves this assumption by the 
following statement “fault of person proximate reason for committing unsafe act, or for existence 
of mechanical or physical hazard, Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). 
The ineffectiveness of using human error as the largest cause of accidents can be readily 
found in the following arguments demonstrated by Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). If a safe 
system is a system that its failure probability is very low, for instance 10-5, so there will be at 
least 99,999 cases of successful actions of each case of failure. In other words, if human error is 
the cause of the adverse events, what is the cause of all other successful actions? In fact, they 
behave in the same manner everyday regardless of the possible outcome of the actions whether 
its positive or negative, naturally because they are not aware of the consequences of their actions 
at the time of acting. A more productive way to see this phenomenon is to instead of calling 
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human as the largest cause of failures, try to recognize how performance varies and study why 
the behavior that most of the time goes right occasionally makes things go wrong, Besnard and 
Hollnagel (2012). 
In summation, “human error” focuses merely on cognitive aspects and context of the 
work is in the shadow. This fact narrows cause of adverse outcomes to human malfunction with 
little attention to how and why people adjust their performance, that bolds the importance of 
“bridging the gap between what must be done and what can be done” (Runte, 2010, p. 3) 
 
2.3.2 Procedure Compliance 
There is an established and strong belief that design of interfaces, work specifications and 
procedures is always correct and if a failure happens, it is simply going to be found as a “human 
error”. In another words, the assumption is that humans, as fallible machines, are the source of 
variability that leads to occurrences of undesirable outcomes; therefore, following the procedures 
will not only get the job done, but also get it done well. On the other hand, working situations 
frequently differ from the even precise working instructions and strict compliance may be 
disadvantageous to both safety and efficiency, Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). 
It is not feasible to anticipate all the possible situations that may happen in a workplace 
and prescribe an adequate instruction for every single activity. A safe outcome will not be 
ensured by a rigid compliance, while it requires that the operator evaluates the adequacy of, and 
adopt, procedures to operational conditions (Besnard, 2006). This is why there is always a gap 
between work-as-imagined and work-as-done and humans are constantly required to adjust their 




2.3.3 Layers of Protection and Safety 
 Safety can be achieved either by eliminating risks or by protecting against their effects. 
How would it be possible? The traditional perspective in safety proposes improved barriers and 
protection. At first glance it seems logical to have a safer system by providing more layers of the 
protection. It is a philosophy behind safety in numerous systems like motor vehicles where 
multiple passive and active safety systems (Anti Blocking System (ABS), crumple zones, safety 
belts, airbags, etc.) shield drivers from the injury, Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). 
  Two main reasons demonstrate that more protection does not necessarily provide a safer 
system. The first one is psychological and related to habituation where people adopt themselves 
to the perceived level of risk protection. A study conducted by Aschenbrenner and Biehl (1994) 
showed that taxi drivers whose cars equipped with ABS drove more aggressively and their 
accident rates, compared to other drivers, were slightly higher. This study demonstrates that 
humans naturally respond to increased protection counter-intuitively. The second reason is 
technical and demonstrates that adding more protection layers increase the complexity of the 
system. The more a system is complex, the number of combinations that may lead to unwanted 
outcomes significantly increases, Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). 
 Obviously, it does not mean that to improve safety less protection is the way or that 
increased protection never works. It merely means that the effects of implementing additional 





2.3.4 Causalities of Adverse Outcomes 
 The assumption is that root-cause-analysis (RCA) can identify why accidents happen in 
complex socio-technical systems. Although RCA is deeply involved in the safety-related 
practices in industry and even there are certificates for people who practice it, but the validity of 
its methods (such as Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Mode & Effects Analysis, Functional 
Resonance Analysis, etc.) critically depends on that the outcomes of events are bimodal. It 
means that outcomes are either correct or incorrect (Hollnagel, 2009). This view is not 
defendable in numerous technical systems where human performance usually varies noticeably 
while fail infrequently (Manion, 2007), even when performance fails it can be recovered by 
humans and maintain the normal situation. Human performance cannot be described as if it is 
bimodal since things simply go wrong in the same way go right in socio-technical systems. 
Therefore, variability in human performance is a great contribution that maintains safety while 
RCA points human as the first reason of unwanted outcomes. In other words, there are many 
cases where root-cause-analysis cannot—and should not—be used, Besnard and Hollnagel 
(2012). 
Fortunately, there are several alternatives that are more appropriate to prospect human, 
organizational and technical factors either individually or in combination. One of these newly 
established approaches is the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), introduced by 
Hollnagel (2004), that describes unexpected events when emerging from low-amplitude 
variability of everyday performance. Another example is Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP) introduced by Leveson (2004) that is based on a systems theory model that 




2.3.5 Accident Investigation 
 The primary purpose of accident investigation is to discover the cause or causes of 
accidents based on the facts logically and rationally. The huge number of accidents and 
constraints of time and resources lead to reduction of the depth of analysis in accident 
investigations. Moreover, resources and demands direct what and how it should be done. The 
management of the investigation then becomes a trade-off between what can be done and what 
should be done: a trade-off between efficiency and thoroughness (Hollnagel, 2009).  
 In real word, accident investigations are normally based on some pre-approved 
implications about how accidents have happened and what measurement can resist the 
reoccurrence (Lundberg et al., 2009). The need to establish responsibilities is another bias 
associated with accident investigation. It means that confusion of responsibility and cause of the 
accident is a crucial obstacle in safety. In other words, the investigation follows the rules that 
instead of finding proper rationality to explain the real cause of accident takes the way that 
shortly fails. Lundberg et al. (2009) called this phenomenon as what-you-look-for-is-what-you-
find (WYLFIWYF), Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). 
 
2.3.6 Safety First 
 The phrase “Safety First” is an actual common heard myth in the world of safety 
management. It means that safety is an absolute priority that can never be compromised. 
However, in real world, economic considerations may sometimes lead to compromise safety. For 
instance, aviation is the only industry that always announce to practice such a policy, but even in 
aviation the intervals of scheduled maintenance for aircrafts has been modified during the 
economic recessions, Woltjer and Hollnagel (2007). It is understandable that safety has financial 
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implications which influence the feasibility of safety measures. It becomes more understandable 
when the costs are immediate and real while the benefits of the safety measures are potential and 
time consuming to be apparent. Furthermore, safety performance is usually measured by the 
relative decrease in the number of situations where things go wrong instead of an increase in the 
number of things go right. In summation, safety comes first whenever the organizations can 
afford it, Besnard and Hollnagel (2012). 
 
2.4 The Need to Change 
 By comparing a work setting in early 1970s with a recent work setting can obviously 
illustrate how new technologies and computers have changed workplaces. In early 1970s there 
were no computers in workplaces or at least the level of automation was very low and computers 
were at background. Currently, workplaces are occupied with computers that support multiple 
tasks directly or indirectly and the difference between today and only 40 years ago is significant. 
(Hollnagel, 2014).  
The high rate of inventions and also the constant striving to increase our mastery of the 
world creates a self-reinforcing cycle of technological innovation. Computing machinery and IT 
devices have occupied everyday life and changed it beyond recognition. It demonstrates the 
emergent of the systems that are parallel while we are still thinking in sequential order. In other 
words, the functionality of systems is constantly developing while the comprehension of 
consequences of this development is unknown. Hollnagel (2014) has indicated this situation as 
the Lost Equilibrium in which we are producing systems that we are unable to control. So 
systems become intractable and the ability to understand what will happen, how it will happen 
and why it will happen becomes faded. 
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These developments are mostly visible from hindsight. Therefore, our traditional ways of 
thinking about safety are not sufficient to cope with today’s complicated socio-technical 
environment. Consequently, the need for developing new methods to fill the gap between “work-
as-imagined” and “work-as-done” becomes critical (Hollnagel, 2014). 
If a system is controllable, it is required to be known in its inside and sufficient data 
should be available to present a clear description of the system. This kind of systems are 
tractable. The opposite side is obviously existing. If a system does not have a clear description or 
it is not possible to know what goes in its inside, the system is intractable. Tractable and 
intractable systems also have some other characteristics. For instances, tractable systems do not 
change when being described, while intractable systems change before description is completed. 
Tractable systems are independent while intractable systems are interdependent. It would be 
beneficial to mention that the inability to predict intractable systems is due to the human and 
organizational parts of the system. For the technical parts, complete specification is a necessity 
for their functioning. Therefore, in order to keep the technology working, human and 
organizations function as a buffer between subsystems and between the system and its 
environment to maintain the variability at a level that is not too high or low (Hollnagel, 2014). 
In summary, performance variability is unavoidable while is also needed as it mentioned 
before in order to maintain the systems functionality. In the entire history of safety, the human 
factor has been always considered as a liability and a source of risk and failure, but by 
mentioning the role of humans in maintaining the balance between systems and environment, the 
value of performance variability is recognized and it will be an asset for systems safety. 
Consequently, the role of humans will be defined as the following when doing a risk assessment 
or accident analysis:  
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 Systems always have some flaws and people must be learnt to identify these flaws and 
maintain functionality of the system. 
 People are able to recognize the actual demands and can adjust their performance 
accordingly. 
 People can match procedures to the conditions wherever they should be applied. 
 People can detect and correct when something goes wrong or when it is about to go wrong 
(Hollnagel, 2014). 
All in all, the performance variability provided by human is an asset and a tool to get the 
work done as possible and close as it imagined. They bridge between what is ideal and what is 
real. Since failure and success both depends on performance variability, failures cannot be 
prevented by eliminating it. In other words, safety cannot be managed by limiting the 
performance variability. The solution is instead to identify the situations where the variability of 
everyday performance may combine to create unwanted effects and constantly monitor how the 
system functions in order to dampen performance variability when it comes to be out of control 
(Hollnagel, 2014).   
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2.5 Moving Towards the New Era - Safety-II 
The arguments in the previous section demonstrated that working environments have 
changed significantly in the last two or three decades and the traditional perspectives in safety, 
Safety-I, is no longer as effective as the past (Hollnagel, 2014). In this section, the novel 
perspective in safety, Safety-II, will be presented. In order to precisely explain Safety-II, Safety-I 
will be firstly deconstructed then the new perspective will be constructed. The deconstruction 
and construction of each perspective have been performed at three different levels, 
Phenomenology, Etiology and Ontology. The implication of each level has been stated below. 
Also the contrasts between Safety-I and Safety-II will be discovered at the end of this section in 
order to provide a better view of each in one frame. 
2.6 Deconstruction of Safety-I 
The first step is phenomenology of safety. Phenomenology refers to the observable 
characteristics or the indicators of safety. By other words, what makes us declare that 
something is safe and something is not safe. 
The indicators of Safety-I are accidents, incidents, near misses, etc., as are declared by 
different authorities such as European Technology Platform on Industrial Safety (ETPIS). 
The irony of Safety-I indicators is that the level of safety is being measured by adverse 
outcomes of safety. It means, the more adverse outcomes happen, the more indicators are 
available and the less adverse outcomes (the safer systems) result in less indicators. By 
other words, the more indicators there are, the less safety there is and vice versa 
(Hollnagel, 2014). 
The second step is the etiology of safety. Etiology is the study of causation, of why things 
occur, or even the study of the reasons or causes behind what happens. 
26 
 
As the phenomenology of Safety-I denotes the indicators of Safety-I which are adverse 
outcomes or things that go wrong, etiology should be about the possible cause of the 
failures and the procedure that they happened through them. Thus, the etiology of Safety-
I is consisted of assumptions about the causality of accidents, incidents, etc. or in general 
indicators of Safety-I. These assumptions can be explained either simply or by compound 
linear developments. The Domino model and Swiss cheese model are examples of 
composite linear explanation of the assumptions, while recently more complicated, but 
still linear schemes of explanation, such as Tripod, AcciMap or STAMP, have been 
released (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The third step is the ontology of safety. Ontology studies illustrate the true nature and the 
essential characteristics of safety. As etiology, it describes how failures result in 
unwanted outcomes, or in other words, description of the true nature of failures. 
Likewise the etiology addresses that how unwanted outcomes happen and explain the 
procedure in which adverse outcomes occur; the ontology discusses the nature of failures. 
The ontology of Safety-I is involved in three major assumptions that have already been 
mentioned. These assumptions incude that systems are decomposable, the functions of 
components can be described in bimodal terms, and the order of events can be 
determined in advance. As is mentioned in the section, “The Need to Change”, it is no 
longer logical to assume that we can understand the causal relationships between actions 
and outcomes, or even that they can be described in causal terms. The ontology of Safety-




2.7 Construction of Safety-II 
The ontology of Safety-II 
As it stated before, numerous of today’s work situations are becoming intractable and our 
inadequate ability to comprehend what we do limits our ability to anticipate the 
consequences of design changes and other means of interventions to enhance safety, 
quality, productivity, etc. In other words, the less controllable a work situation is, the less 
ability to know details and the greater need for performance adjustment.  
Therefore, the ontology of Safety–II is that human performance, separately or jointly, 
always is variable. It means that it is neither possible nor meaningful to characterize 
components of a system bimodal and where they function either successfully or 
unsuccessfully. Performance adjustment should not be confused by performance 
deviation and the ability to put the performance adjustment in its effective way is vital for 
filling the gap between the work-as-done and work-as-imagined (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The Etiology of Safety–II 
A large number of unsuccessful events can still be explained by breaking down the 
components of a system and looking at malfunctions. There is a growing number of cases 
that it is not possible to explain what happens by means decomposing the system or 
reversing the processes. Providing an explanation is still possible, but in other ways and 
by other means. In such a case the outcome is “emergent” instead of being “resultant”. 
The meaning of emergent is not that something happens magically, but simply that it 
happens in such a way that it cannot be explained using the principles of linear causality. 
Emergent outcomes address the causes as elusive (while resultant comes are as real as 
their effects). The outcomes may be because of transient phenomena, combinations of 
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conditions, or conditions that only existed at a particular point in time and space. It 
means, the causes existed at one point in time, but did not leave any permanent trace 
(Hollnagel, 2014). 
Emergent outcomes can be found out as arising from unexpected or unwanted 
combinations of performance variability where the main source is resonance rather than 
causality. Considering ontology of Safety-II, it means that all performance adjustments 
may be in an acceptable level (which in practice they are too small to be noticeable), even 
though the result may be so large that is noticeable. Emergent outcomes are being 
considered as non-linear since the relations between the precedents and the consequents 
is so minor. Because emergence cannot be explained in terms of causality and since there 
is always the need to explain it, some practical principle is required. A new method 
developed by Hollnagel (2012) satisfy the need to explain emergent outcomes. The 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) addresses the dependencies among the 
functions of a system as they develop within a particular situation. Resonance discusses 
the phenomenon that a system can oscillate with larger amplitude at some frequencies 
than at others. At these frequencies even small external forces, that are applied 
repetitively, can result in large amplitude oscillations which may damage the entire 
system seriously (Hollnagel, 2014). A further description of the application of FRAM 
will be discussed in the next section in order to examine the functionality of its main 
purpose which is to investigate systems by a proactive approach.  
The Phenomenology of Safety–II 
As Safety-I was defined as conditions where as little as possible went wrong, Safety-II is 
defined as conditions where as much as possible goes right. The definition of Safety-II 
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has arisen two questions. The first question is how or why things go right? The answer 
has already been mentioned in the ontology of Safety-II by the argument that the 
performance variability and performance adjustments are the basis of every day activity. 
The second question is how we can see what goes right?  This question has been pointed 
out earlier through the discussion of habituation where although it is difficult to notice all 
the right actions, but it is, indeed, a prerequisite for being proactive to understand when 
something is going to be wrong. Considering that reliability is a dynamic non-event 
(Weick, 1987), although non-events are far more important that the events in safety 
managements, it should be more important to consider the things go right rather than 
things go wrong. In a nutshell, safety is something that happens rather than something 
that does not happen. Because it is something that happens, it can be observed, measured 
and managed. Although Safety–I and Safety–II both lead to a reduction in unwanted 
outcomes, they use basically different approaches with important consequences for how 
the process is managed and measured and for productivity and quality. Safety–II 
management and resilience engineering both assume that everything basically happens in 
the same way, regardless of the outcome (Hollnagel, 2014). 
So far in this section, the traditional approach in safety, Safety-I, has been deconstructed in 
three different levels and by the outcomes, a new approach to safety, Safety-II, has been 
proposed. The following paragraphs illustrate a summary of the contrasts between Safety-I and 
Safety-II.  
Phenomenology of Safety; 
Accidents, incidents, near misses, etc., are the manifestation of Safety-I. It means 
that a system is unsafe if such events occur, or the system is safe if no such events occur. 
30 
 
The conflict is when safety is required to be measured by the adverse effects, such as 
injuries or incidents of safety (Hollnagel, 2014). 
Alternatively, the manifestation of Safety-II is defined as a condition where 
everything goes right. It means that from Safety-II vantage point, safety is something that 
happens instead of something that does not happen. Since it is something that happens, it 
can be observed, measured, and managed (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
Etiology of Safety; 
In Safety-I, it includes assumptions about the causality of its manifestation 
(accidents, incidents, etc.) and also the results that can be explained in order to characterize 
a malfunction. In other words, in Safety-I the causality of accidents or incidents is based 
on number of assumptions that lead us towards a single, or sometimes multiple, root causes. 
These root causes are the result of decompensation of the entire system. There are few 
models that can describe the casualty of events, such as Swiss Cheese Model (Linear) or 
STAMP (non-Linear) (Hollnagel, 2014). 
Not surprisingly, in Safety-II the outcomes are considered as emergent. It means 
they may be due to temporary phenomena, combinations of conditions, or conditions that 
only existed at a certain point in time and place. Since emergence cannot be illuminated in 
terms of causality, and since we do need to explain it, some new methods such as FRAM 




Ontology of safety; 
In Safety-I we are trying to understand completely what we do in order to be able 
to anticipate the consequences of design changes and implementing new means of 
interventions, ironically, in Safety-II we have limited ability to recognize what we do. It is 
purely because of the irony that the most socio-technical systems are intractable and work 
conditions are totally different from what has been imagined. 
In the Safety-I way of thinking, human performance has been prescribed by characterizing 
all components of the system, while in Safety-II human performance is always variable. In 
other words, in traditional safety, Safety-I, variability is not desirable.  However, in Safety-




2.8 Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
2.8.1 Resilience Engineering 
As it was discussed earlier, the third age of safety brought the emergence of socio-
technical systems into consideration. The notion of a socio-technical system is that the conditions 
for performing successfully - oppositely for unsuccessful performances – are generated when 
social and technical factors are interacting. The consequences of these interactions, which 
include both linear and non-linear emergent relationships, are: 
 System performance cannot be optimized by focusing on only either social or 
technical aspect lonely.  
 Socio-technical systems cannot be safe by analyzing only the system components and 
their failure probabilities. By other words, the safety assessment of socio-technical 
systems cannot be achieved by inducing the principles of reliability engineering and 
Probability Risk Analysis (PRA) (Hollnagel, (CRC), & Cedex, 2013). 
A research conducted by Hollnagel & Speziali (2008) studied the developments in accident 
investigation methods and it illustrated that although the socio-technical systems continue to 
develop and to be more complex, the accident investigation methods do not change or develop. 
In other words, the methods we have and apply today may be inappropriate since the world 
changes consistently. It also means that even the new methods after some time will become less 
effective, however they were perfectly essential and adequate for the problems of that time. The 
same issue obviously exists for risk and safety assessment methods. Actually, the predominant 
models and methods date from the 1970’s or earlier (Hollnagel, et al., 2013). 
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The traditional safety models analyze events as they are chains and sequences of causes and 
effects, either as simple linear progress or as combinations of it. Accident investigation and risk 
assessment models both proceed in a sequential manner, gradually follow the links either 
backward or forward from the chosen starting point. Examples of accident investigation models 
are the Domino model (simple linear) or the Swiss Cheese model (complex linear) and for risk 
assessment models, event trees (simple linear) and fault trees (complex linear) (Hollnagel, et al., 
2013).  
The unwanted or unexpected outcomes or events that lead to them can happen in the absence 
of malfunctions or failures and be due to performance variability or other temporary phenomena.  
It is also normal that the relationship between the events and outcomes is not linear and the 
source and severity of the results may be unpredictable form the preceding events. In this cases, 
the events are better to be called emergent rather than result of casual relations. This 
phenomenon mostly happens because of the high level of intractability of socio-technical 
systems. Since, socio-technical systems tend to expand continually and have closer interactions 
among their subsystems, mostly due to external request for effectiveness and productivity 
(Hollnagel, et al., 2013). 
The current approaches to risk assessment are required to have the entire system described in 
detail. In a nut shell, the system should be tractable in order to be assessed. The problem is that 
the socio-technical systems are intractable and it is neither possible nor reasonable to simplify 
and describe the system in detail. Therefore, it is required to apply new approaches that can be 
used for intractable systems (Hollnagel, et al., 2013). 
Resilience Engineering represents such an approach that has a different view to risk 
assessment. Instead of decomposing the entire system in order to count errors and calculate the 
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failure probabilities, Resilience Engineering follows other principles. It begins with description 
of characteristic functions and looks for ways to improve an organization’s ability to create 
processes that are fixed but flexible, to monitor and review risk models, and to use resources in a 
proactive way in the face of unexpected events. In Resilience Engineering, failures are not being 
considered as adverse outcomes of a normal system functions, but states the lack of adaptions 
with the real situations complexity (Hollnagel, et al., 2013). 
The safety of socio-technical systems depends on four major facts that the developments of 
models and methods are required to be based on them (Hollnagel, et al., 2013):  
 Performance conditions are always underspecified. Working situations are so 
detailed and it is difficult to specify them. Therefore, people and organizations should 
adjust their performances to maintain the desired condition. Since resources are 
limited, these adjustments are approximate. Performance variability is unavoidable, 
while is a source of success as well as failure.  
 Although many of adverse outcomes are due to malfunctioning of components in a 
normal situation, many are not. These intractable adverse events happen as a result of 
unexpected combinations of variability in normal performances. 
 Safety management cannot be effective if it counts on the calculation of failure 
probabilities. Effective controls should be proactive and the responses are prepared 
and performed ahead of time. It is not reasonable and adequate to count failures then 
decide to remove or control them.  
 Safety is part of the core process. Safety is a requirement for productivity, and 
productivity is achieved by safety. A safe system becomes safer by improvements 
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instead of constraints (Hollnagel, et al., 2013). 
 
Therefore, in Resilience Engineering, an organization should have the following four 
characteristics in order to be safe (Hollnagel, Woods, & Levenson, 2006): 
 The ability to respond to systematic and non-systematic threats in a strong but flexible 
manner. 
 The ability to monitor what is going on, counting its own performance. 
 The ability to anticipate risks and opportunities in the more extended period.  
 The ability to learn from experience.  
All of the four characteristics are critically depended on what kind of model the organization 
is based on. The model is basically the assumptions about the nature of the process that are being 
taken in the organization. This model is so important for risk assessment and accident 
investigation since it helps to understand what criteria should be considered and how relations 
between system components can be described. Figure 3 below shows these four qualities in a 
























Figure 3 - The four qualities of resilience (Hollnagel, et al., 2013) 
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2.8.2 Development of The FRAM 
The purpose of the development of FRAM is to provide a method that recognizes successes 
as the opposite side of failures. The method also should be able to recognize past events as well 
as possible future events, specially what might go wrong (Hollnagel, 2012). 
FRAM is built on four principles: 
The equivalence of failures and successes 
Things go right and go wrong for the same reason, by another words they have the same 
origin. Failures and successes are equivalent until the outcome is known, though the preceding 
actions are right or wrong. This argumentation was pointed out by psychologists. Ernst Mach 
who said that “knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell one 
from the other” (Hollnagel, 2012). 
The performance adjustment 
Every day performance of socio-technical systems, separately or jointly, maintains the 
desired conditions (Hollnagel, 2012). 
Human performance is variable due to number of factors such as: 
 Inherent physiological and/or psychological characteristics, such as fatigue, vigilance 
and attention. 
 Organizational factors, such as external demands and deadlines. 
 Social factors, such as being compliance with group working, standards and so on. 
 Circumstantial factors, such as working conditions that can be too hot, too noisy, too 
humid and so on (Hollnagel, 2012). 
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In large socio-technical systems, work situations are mostly intractable, therefore, people 
are needed to adjust their performance to match the conditions. These adjustments are critical 
since the situations are unspecified and resources are not sufficient. Humans are tremendously 
proficient at discovering ways of overcoming work problems and enhance the efficiency, so this 
capability is vital for both safety and productivity. In a nut shell, performance variability is a 
strength rather than a liability (Hollnagel, 2012). 
The emergence  
Many of the outcomes, either they have been noticed or not, should be described as 
emergent rather than resultant. There is a growing number of cases in which it is not either 
possible nor logical to explain the causality of events that are result of known processes. 
Although it is still possible to explain what happened, but the explanation will be in another way. 
It has been called “emergent” rather than “resultant”. The meaning of emergent is not something 
that happens magically, but it happens in such a way that are not explainable by methods using 
the principles of decomposition and causality (Hollnagel, 2012). 
Resonance 
The relations between the functions of a system should be described as they develop in a 
certain situation rather than as preset cause-effect links. The first reason is that the coupling 
between the functions cannot be stated in advance precisely. The second reason is that the 
dependencies can go beyond a simple cause-effect relationship. Actually, the third principle – 
emergence – represented some events that are not explainable in terms of cause and effect 
relationship and a more comprehensive method is required to explain it. The fourth principle – 
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resonance – apply functional resonance approaches in order to explain what can happen in 
complex socio-technical systems (Hollnagel, 2012). 
2.8.3 Development of a FRAM Analysis 
 The first step in using FRAM is to make it clear whether is going to be used as an 
accident investigation tool or as a risk assessment. In other words, determine whether it looks at 
what has happened or looks at what may happen in future. Hollangel (2012) has called this step 
as “Step 0” where the purpose of the FRAM analysis should be determined. The main goal of 
Step 0 is to set the prospect for the four steps that should be taken in order to use FRAM as either 
an accident investigation or risk assessment tool (Hollnagel, 2012). 
In this study, FRAM has been used for risk assessment, so the four steps and the scope of the 
analysis will be described on this basis. When the FRAM is used as a risk assessment tool, the 
first step defines the scope and the resolution of the descriptions along with the systems’ 
boundaries in which the FRAM being used. The second step narrows the possible outcomes in 
the purpose of founding the instantiations and actual variability. The third step continue the 
narrowing but in the ways to find the interactions of performance variability in the forms of 
functional resonance. The fourth step requires thinking about how a potential not-desired 
performance variability can be detected and dampened in order to maintain the safety of the 
system (Hollnagel, 2012).  
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2.8.3.1 The First Step 
The first step of the FRAM is about identifying the functions that are needed to maintain the 
everyday work successes. The main goal of this step is to describe the work in details in such a 
way that the work is done as a routine activity, instead of providing a working instruction that 
just describe how the task should be done (Hollnagel, 2012). 
To identify the function, a prospective analysis as in a risk assessment, a timeline is mostly 
available, like a safety case. If it is not the case, different approaches should be taken in order to 
identify the functions. Task Analysis is a basic for identifying functions. A task analysis 
generally includes sub-tasks that are ordered from simplest to the most complex one. In order to 
develop a Task Analysis, Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) provides the required approach. 
HTA decomposes a task multiple times until it reaches to an elementary level where each sub-is 
this figure in the right place? task represents a specified goal. An example of a HTA can be seen 





Turn the key 
clockwise 
Put key in lock 
Open a Door 
Figure 4 - an example of HTA approach 
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The Six Aspects of FRAM 
 In the FRAM, a function can be characterized by the six different aspects or features as 
explained bellow (Hollnagel, Hounsgaard, & Colligan, 2014): 
 Input (I): That which activates the function and/or is used or transformed to produce the 
output. Constitutes the link to upstream functions. 
 Output (O): That which is the result of the function. Constitutes the links to downstream 
functions. 
 Preconditions (P): System conditions that must be fulfilled before a function can be 
carried out. 
 Resources (R): That which the function needs when it is carried out (Execution 
Condition) or consumes to produce the Output. 
 Time (T): Temporal constraints affecting the function (with regard to starting time, 
finishing time or duration). 
 Control (C): How the function is monitored or controlled.  
A FRAM function is represented graphically by a hexagon, where each vertex relates to 
an aspect, as shown in Figure 5 below. In the FRAM, links are clearly defined between the 
functions. Since a FRAM model is the descriptions of functions, arrows are not used like in 




2.8.3.2 The Second Step 
The second step addresses the potential variability and the actual variability that both 
establish the FRAM model. The way in which is possible to identify the characterization of 
performance variability is to understand how functions coupled and how it leads to unexpected 
outcomes. In FRAM, looking at the variability of the output from the function is more important 
than at the variability of the function by itself. The potential variability can be also recognized as 
“Internal” and “External” variability, if it is looked more precisely. The internal variability is 
about how likely a function varies by itself, while the external variability is about how likely a 
function varies as a consequence of the working conditions, which in turn may be seen as the 
outcome of other functions (Hollnagel, 2012). 
There are two ways in order to detect performance variability, either internal or external, and 
how it may affect downstream functions. The simple solution, which indeed is the more practical 
and not so comprehensive, and the more elaborate solution which is comprehensive but not too 














Figure 5 - The six aspects of a function or activity in the FRAM model (Hollnagel, 2012) 
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environment and because of the first purpose of this study, which is to examine the feasibility of 
the FRAM analysis, the simple solution has been used for this study.  
The simple solution to discover the consequences of the performance variability is to note 
that the Output from a function can vary in terms of timing and precision. In the FRAM, the 
Output of a function is not being considered by itself but instead the Output as it is used by a 
downstream function - as Input, Precondition, Resource, Control or Time. In terms of timing, 
variability happens where an Output occur too early, on time, too late or not at all. In terms of 
precision, an Output can be precise, acceptable or imprecise. Since the precision depends on the 
coupling between upstream and downstream functions, it can be so relative. If the Output is 
precise, the needs of the downstream function is fulfilled and vice versa (Hollnagel, 2012). 
2.8.3.4 The Third Step 
Hence a FRAM model is not being used for a certain situation, it can merely represent the 
potential variability. Scientific knowledge and practical experience play a crucial role in order to 
estimate a range of performance variability. An instantiation represents a solid example of the 
model for specified circumstances and conditions, and the details provided by the instantiation 
makes it possible to be more precise about whether and how the potential variability can become 
actual variability. However, it still is not enough to determine if the actual variability is for 
individual functions. The functional upstream-downstream coupling, which is the whole purpose 
of Step 3, is to provide an adequate description of how differences in the quality of upstream 
Outputs can affect the variability of downstream functions, and thereby the variability of their 
Output. It certainly depends on the function whether it is technological, human or organizational. 





2.8.3.5 The Fourth Step  
The last and obviously not the least step is to propose ways to manage the possible 
occurrences of uncontrolled performance variability or in other words, the possible conditions of 
functional resonance. Since the primary purpose of the FRAM is to identify the performance 
variability within in a system, the problem areas in the system’s functioning is being identified in 
addition to the more traditional analysis such as failure modes and malfunctions. Once the 
problems have been found, the hierarchical controls like below should be taken (Hollnagel, 
2012): 
 The elimination of the hazards, which is possible by removing the affected components 
of the system. 
 The prevention of the hazards, which is possible through placing barriers or defense 
before undesired outcomes happen.  
 The facilitation of the hazards, which is more along with resilience engineering goals, 
provides safety by redesigning the system in such a way that is not possible to do things 
wrong.  
 The protection of the hazards, which provides safety via barriers where undesired 
outcomes happen. 
In socio-technical, control of safety and quality are required to be managed by setting 
appropriate goals and targets, so the ongoing processes and developments can be monitored and 
that activity can be trackable. In order to select proper indicators to monitor, compromising 
between effectiveness and thoroughness is always involved. A FRAM model can be used as a 
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tool to anticipate the potential unwanted events that may happen due to the developments, for 
example by recognizing couplings that lead to increase in performance variability. Therefore, a 
FRAM model can be proposed as a proper indicator (Hollnagel, 2012). 
2.8.4 How to Collect Data for the FRAM 
 All things considered, the illustrated steps should be taken in order to do a risk 
assessment, unlike the traditional risk assessment which only looks at probability and severity of 
undesired results. It is worth mentioning again that the first purpose of the FRAM is to identify 
the sources of variability and how they may be managed. By other words and from the risk 
assessment perspective, the main goal is to identify and reduce variability to stop the occurrence 
of resonance that would create problems within the system (Albery, Borys, & Tepe, 2016). 
 The FRAM is to describe how an activity is performed and the selected activity should be 
described in terms of functions needed for performing it. If Figure 6 below shows the normal 
distribution of the result of an activity, the purpose of the FRAM is not to described the lower 
tail, 0.6%, which represents accidents and errors and the upper tail, 0.6%, which represents 
obvious successes. Instead, the FRAM aims to describe the 98.8% that falls in between. The 





Figure 6 - Source: From Safety I to Safety II: A White Paper. European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation. (Hollnagel 
et al., 2013) 
 
 Accordingly, the question arises where to obtain this information. The best source of 
information about the activities of interest is the people who actually carry out the work. 
Interviews are the primary tool to obtain this information along with field observation and 
document reviews (Hollnagel et al., 2014).  
For interviews, it is very fundamental to comprehend the purpose of the study. It means 
that the interviewees should know how much information is needed and how will that 
information be helpful? Necessary sources of information such as rules, regulations, protocols, 
job descriptions, etc. should be prepared before going into the field. In order to form the basis of 
the set of questions, data on turnover of personnel, equipment, procedure and organization and 




2.8.5 How to Synthesize Collected Data 
 The collected data from the interviews and information during the preparation phase need 
to be synthesized by the FRAM principles. The analysis team needs to identify the important 
functions and sort the material based on them. The foreground and background functions can be 
recognized at this stage if it is possible. For the foreground function, the six aspects (Input; 
Output; Preconditions; Resources; Control; Time) should be recognized. Information on Input 
and Output represents the basic minimum required. The Output should be described in detail 
with respect to time and precision. Regarding the time, it should be determined whether the 
Output varies by coming too early, on time or too late. For precision, the Output should be 
determined if it is imprecise, acceptable, or precise. It should be noted that each function is 
required to be documented by firstly its name then a detailed description of it (Hollnagel et al., 
2014). 
2.8.6 Risk Assessment by Risk Matrix vs. FRAM 
The risk matrix has not been designed to identify the risks associated with performance 
variability and it focuses only on the hazards within a system, not the entire system within its 
environment (Albery, Borys, & Tepe, 2016). Dissimilar to risk matrix assessments that merely 
explore probability and severity of hazards within a system, a FRAM assessment requires a more 
comprehensive approach that includes four steps. The first two steps are mainly concentrated on 
understanding and defining work-as-done, the third step look at the emergent system situations 






This research aimed to investigate the validity and applicability of the newly proposed 
risk assessment tool, FRAM, in a different manufacturing environment where hidden hazards are 
not recognizable by linear risk assessment methods and using a tool with greater requisite variety 
may mitigate them. Albery et.al (2016) established a research method in order to investigate if 
the question sets inspired by the concept of FRAM and Safety-II can mitigate the hazards that are 
not identified by linear risk assessment methods. He developed a research method that 
investigates the entire system in addition to the hazards and their controls in isolation by using 
question sets inspired by the FRAM/Safety-II and risk matrix/Safety-I. Hence the Safety-I 
perspective is included in Safety-II, it has been proposed that the FRAM embraces risk matrix. 
Albery developed the research grounded on the following logic and designed a methodology that 
pursues four objectives: “1- understanding work-as-imagined; 2- understanding work-as-done; 3- 
evaluating learnings from a Risk Matrix/Safety-I assessment; 4- evaluating learnings from a 
FRAM/Safety-II assessment” (Albery, et al., 2016). The limited number of research studies that 
have been performed in order to encourage stakeholders to look for resources of variability in 
their working systems and also the need for investigating the application of the Safety-II 
approach, motivate the researcher to replicate the methodology of Albery’s study in order to 
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explore a greater sample size and also a different type of manufacturing environment to 
understand if similar relationships exist in other industries.     
The objectives of the research are set in order to create a learning cycle (Argyris, 1999) 
that benefits both researcher and the organization on two certain phases: the work-as-imagined 
that provides a background for work-as-done (reflects understanding how the work is performed 
and how it is planned to be performed), and the risk assessment based on Safety-I perspective 
that provides data for the FRAM-based risk assessment (reflects comparison and evaluation of 
risk matrix/Safety-I and FRAM/Safety-II in hazards identification and management).  
Learning is defined to happen under two criteria. The first is when an organization 
achieves what is intended (a small gap between the design of action and what in reality happens), 
the second is when a mismatch between the intention and outcome is recognized and afterwards 
its correction happens, the mismatch turns into a match (Argyris, 1999).  
Organizations do not provide learning; in fact, the individuals who are acting as agents in 
organizations behave in a way that results in learning. Organizations can create a setting that 
substantially effect the scope of the problem recognition and designing a solution. Whenever a 
failure is recognized and solved with no question or changing in the fundamental of the system, 
the learning is a single-loop. On the other hand, when a system asks why the changes are 
occurring and why the system is programmed in this order, the learning is double-loop. Single-
loop learning occurs when matches between the designed and actual actions happen, or the 
mismatches are corrected by changing actions. Double-loop learning occurs when mismatches 
are corrected by first investigating and changing the leading variables and then by the actions 
(Argyris, 1999). Consequently, in order to create a cycle of learnings, the objectives of the 





In an attempt to achieve the objectives of the research through the methodology, a range 
of environments with different complexity, process control, and therefore variability was 
selected. In other words, systems have been selected based on the objectives of the research 
which are essentially looking for the variabilities in the systems; i.e. the systems that have high 
variability and low control, and the systems that have high control and low variability.   
A medium-voltage electrical equipment manufacturing factory was selected that designs 
and produces instrument transformers that accurately meter either current or voltage on an 
electrical circuit in order to protect the metering instrumentation from the power available in the 
circuit.  The plant occupies 110,000 square feet and employs 200 people with considerable 
cultural and language diversity and also variety of involvement throughout the plant, from 
Research & Development Engineers to Line Assemblers who are involved in different types of 







Figure 7 - Double-Loop learning flowchart (Albery, 2016) 
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The business has been representing a branch of one of the largest engineering companies 
as well as one of the largest conglomerates in the world that has tremendous layers of 
management in its systems. The corporation has operations in around 100 countries, with 
approximately 135,000 employees in December 2015, and reported global revenue of $35.5 
billion for 2015 (ABB Group, 2016). 
The plant consists of several departments, receiving, core winding, core fabrication, 
medium voltage assembly/winding, casting, packing and testing, Thermoplastic Rubber (TPR), 
Outdoor products (ODP) and shipping. Each department is involved in numerous functions and 
works within an integrated system. While some of the departments are not part of the main 
production streamline and manufacture products out of the main production line, similar to fuses 
and switches in ODP departments, all the departments consistently follow the general safety and 
quality guidelines.   
As it has been mentioned, the systems have been selected based on the objectives of the 
research and discussions with the safety manager and the supervisors within the manufacturing 
environment using two main attributes. First, the systems with low process control which are 
characterized with high variability meaning that the workers are engaged in more physical and 
mental activities to complete the task. Second, systems with high level of controls require a 
lower degree of mental and/or physical engagement of workers which result in low variability.  
The systems were selected in two coupled pairs, so the variability effects of upstream or 
downstream can be seen on the overall systems. The process of selecting the systems based on 
the required criteria conducted through the discussion with quality engineers and production 
managers who have the better understanding of the systems and the variability that occurs within 
the systems. Consequently, Medium Voltage Assembly/Winding and Mold Build Up/Casting 
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jobs have been selected to represent the systems with high variability and low control, besides 
Cutouts Pre and Final Assembly Line that are representing the systems with low variability and 
high control.  
Four sets of questions located in Table 2 were created in order to investigate the systems 
based on the objectives and criteria of the research. The question sets were created based on the 
literature, Albery (2016) & Hollnagel (2014), and interviews with professionals and experts 
within the industry in order to ensure that four major elements of the research, work-as-
imagined, work-as-done, Safety-I perspective risk assessment and Safety-II perspective risk 
assessment have been embraced respectively. The questions were revised a number of times to 
cope with the criteria of the research and also to encompass the main objective of this research 
which is to investigate the validation of Albery’s (2016) study. Moreover, in order to convey a 
clear meaning of the questions and also to prevent misunderstanding, the language of the 
question sets was customized to the manufacturing environment and participants’ setting.  
For each system, the same question sets were used while the narrative of the questions 
were constantly being checked to ensure that are aligned with the objectives of the research. 
Eight workers, two supervisors, two quality engineers and one production engineer (Table 2.1), 
who were in their respective roles for more than one year and were quite experienced, were 
selected to be interviewed.  
The number of the interviewees were affected by several reasons. The first one was the 
presence of two pairs of systems with different characteristics, high variability/low control and 
low variability/high control. The second was the number of quality engineers and supervisors 
that were working in each system respectively. Since there were four groups of people that were 
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interviewed, the following paragraphs describe the rationales for selections of the number of 
interviewees in each group.  
 Foremost, with the purpose of decreasing the bias in answers to the 
questions, two workers respectively from each of the four job 
stations (systems) were selected and it resulted in number of eight. 
In other words, eight workers who played a crucial role to 
understand how they performed the job, protected themselves from 
the hazardous situations and also maintained the positive system 
performance were interviewed.  
 Two quality engineers and two supervisors were selected to answer 
the questions regarding to the FRAM objective in order to 
understand how variability take place within the systems and how 
the performance adjustments would maintain the outcome of the 
systems at the desired level where all stakeholders could benefit. 
One quality engineer and one supervisor were selected for MV 
Winding and Mold Casting job stations (high variability/low 
control) and one quality engineer and one supervisor were selected 
for Cutouts Pre and Final Assembly (low validity/high control).  
 One production engineer was selected in order to understand how 
the work was intended to be performed by all the workers at all the 
job stations. In other words, the production engineer provided a 
more inclusive perspective in order to achieve the first object which 
was to understand the work-as-imagined.  
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The last reason that affected the number of the interviewees was the ultimate aim of this 
research which is to investigate the validation of Albery’s study. It means that it was attempted 
to maintain the sample size as close as to the original study in order to avoid lurking variables 
affection (A lurking variable is a variable that is not included as an explanatory or response 
variable in the analysis but can affect the interpretation of relationships between variables). 
 The sequence of asking the question sets was based on the objective of the research that 
are illustrated in the Figure 8. The production engineer was selected for the first iteration in order 
to understand how the work was imagined to be carried out for each individual activity. Each 
activity was reviewed in a high level of details and the working instruction that were issued by 
the respective quality control group were studied precisely. Then the workers were interviewed 
for the second, third and fourth objectives that are learnings from work-as-done, risk matrix and 
FRAM findings. In other words, workers were interviewed respectively in order to understand 
how the work was being performed in their particular activity, how they managed the hazards 
that they were exposed to day by day and also to understand how they maintained the outcome of 
the system at the desired level in uncommon conditions. As a final point, the supervisors and 
quality engineers were interviewed for the fourth objective, FRAM, in order to get additional 
perspectives regarding to the system performance outcomes and the variability and adjustments 
that happened within the respective systems.  
At the time of the research, the researcher had worked at the plant as a Health, Safety and 
Environment (HSE) Intern for more than five months. Adequate insight about the systems within 
the facility and the organization had been attempted to gain during this period of time. 
Furthermore, the researcher had no line management relationships or influence on any of the 
participants of the research either directly or indirectly.  
54 
 
The question sets were inquired verbally, no questionnaire survey was used, based on a 
semi-structured interview process for three major reasons: (i) to avoid the potential poor 
response (Austin, 1981), (ii) to have the opportunity to evaluate the validity of the respondent’s 
answers by observing non-verbal indicators such as facial expressions, posture, hand gestures 
and in general body language (Gordon, 1975), (iii) to simulate the real time risk assessment on 
the job. The interview was centering discussions on the work conditions, job barriers and 
complexity of the entire process in the workers’ own language (Barriball & While, 1994). The 
answers to the questions were captured manually without using any type of audio-taping 
equipment for the reason of simulating a real time risk assessment and to avoid any biases that 
the worker may perceive being audiotaped as being intrusive. The researcher conducted the data 
collection with assistance of a second coder to ensure that the answers to the questions had been 
captured and noted properly. The second coder was a graduate student with adequate experience 
in safety and research projects and also cultural communication skills assisted the researcher to 
ensure that the questions are properly debriefed and the answers have been appropriately noted. 
The data assortment was performed at the end of each interview in order to confirm that the 
collected data was captured and organized appropriately. The University & Medical Center 
Institutional Review Board Office of East Carolina University had approved the research as an 
exempt certified study prior to conducting the research. The IRB approval letter has been shown 
in Appendix B.  
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Table 2 - Question Sets Inspired by FRAM perspectives (Hollnagel 2014, Albery at al., 2016) 





and (Albery, et al., 
2016) 
 
1. Are there any controlled documents to describe the job? 
2. Are the main factors of the job recognized? 
3. Are there any prerequisites before starting the job? 
4. Are there any instructions for the changing conditions? 
5. Are there any controls applied to limit the deviation/variation? 
2. Work-as-done 
Inspired by 
(Albery, et al., 
2016) 
1. What is the best possible way to do the job? 
2. How close is the best way you do the job to the pre-employment training? 
3. Has the team lead or supervisor enforced you to change the way you are doing the 
job? If so, how often? 
4. Has anything unpredicted ever happened? If so, explain it. 
5. Do you think that would be something beneficial to improve the work procedure? 
(By changing the material or the methods) 
6. Are the tools a right fit to the job? 
7. Is the material being used the best you have ever seen? (According to the previous 
changes) 
8. How do you distinguish if the quality is acceptable? 
9. Do you call the team lead whenever you detect a problem in the work or keep 
working until you they come to you? 
3. Risk matrix/ 
Safety-I  
Inspired by 
(Albery, at al., 
2016) 
1. Do you think there are any hazards that would hurt you? Are they recognized by 
the HSE team? 
2. How is the severity of the hazard? 
a. LOW - ‘‘Band-Aid type injuries” 
b. MEDIUM - ‘‘A day off” 
c. HIGH – ‘‘More than day off” 
3. How often does it happen? 
a. Unlikely – “Less than one time in the past 3 years” 
b. Possible – “One time in the last year” 
c. Likely – “More than one time in the last year” 
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and (Albery, et 
al., 2016) 
1. How often does the process change due to the material/process issued? * 
2. How do you select the employees? * Tell me about the training and turnover.  
3. When and why is a unit rejected? *   
4. What is the most common reason to reject a unit? * 
5. How would the potential hazards, due to the changes, be identified and 
controlled? ** 
6. Can you stop the running process in order to maintain an adjustment? ** 
7. How do you manage an unexpected situation? (in order to save time and material) 
*** 
8. How long does it take to solve a problem? *** 
 *To avoid the negative consequences 
**To maintain performance adjustments 
***To compensate performance adjustments 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of number of interviewees 
Objective Participant Type Number Interviewed 
1- Work-as-imagined Production Engineer  1 
2- Work-as-done Workers 8 










The data that was collected by the both researcher and second coder has been transcribed 
into a FRAM based template (Hollnagel, 2012). The data were analyzed according to the 
principles introduced in “The Functional Resonance Analysis Method: Modeling Complex 














1- Work-as-imagined - On Site: observation and interview 
2- Work-as-done - On Site: observation and interview 
3- Risk Matrix approach - On Site: observation and interview 
4- FRAM approach - On Site: observation and interview 
Off Site: Data Saturation, planning the next cycle 
Off Site: Data Saturation, planning the next cycle 
Off Site: Data Saturation, planning the next cycle 
Coupled Systems Coupled Systems 





 According to several discussions at the beginning phases of the research with the safety 
manager of the plant and also quality engineers and supervisors in the manufacturing area, it was 
concluded to select four systems (job stations) with the characteristics described in the 
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Coupled Systems Coupled Systems 
Figure 9 - Summarized qualities of each system (Albery, 2016) 
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 System 1 was selected from the Medium Voltage Assembly area. In this area several 
workers are assigned to assemble the core parts of Current Transformers and Voltage 
Transformers. It required workers to perform several actions on the coil before shaping the core 
and before proceeding to the casting and molding sections which is the system 2. In other words, 
the system 1 output is the input of system 2. In the System 1, the assembler should set the coil 
assembly into a fixture that is designed to hold the coil and to prevent any damage to the parts 
then he/she inserts layers of the core into the coil by sliding them from the smallest one to the 
largest. Later, the assembler performs some actions to fix the coil on the core by putting straps, 
bands and wedges. The support bracket, leads and terminals are placed in this section. After 
some static tests, the finished core goes to the Mold Build up and Casting section which is 
system 2. In this section, the operators pre-heat (125 +/- 5 degrees of Celsius) the finished cores 
for minimum of two hours and then load them into molding fixtures based on the type of the unit 
that is intended to produce. Several molding fixtures are available and the operator has to select 
the correct one according to his/her trainings and experience. The core coil assembly should be 
placed on mold baseplate and get attached by the appropriate fasteners. Terminal blocks and high 
voltage terminals fixtures shall be secured by the correct fasteners as well. Afterwards, the 
prepared built up mold proceeds to the casting area to be filled up by epoxy resin and hardeners.  
 System 3 required workers to assemble a number of individual steel components into a 
fixture (an epoxy-glass fuse tube in cutouts) by using a pneumatic rivet machine and some hand 
jobs which produce the fuse tube part of cutouts that are receiving the final assembly in system 4. 
By other words, the system 3 provides the prerequisite part which is needed by the system 4. In 
system 3, the operator is required to attach the C-blade to the fuse tube using a washer, a 
stainless steel pin, a spring and a blade stop with the help of a pneumatic rivet machine in order 
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to construct the fuse tube. When the tubes are ready, they proceed to the final assembly station 
where they are needed alongside the other parts to produce the cutouts. Eight operators in cutout 
assembly line work constantly to produce three different types of cutouts (ICX, NCX and LBU) 
according to the Work Order Form they receive at the beginning of the shift. System 4 requires 
the assemblers to place the poured porcelain assembly in the assembly jig, attach the top and 
bottom bracket assembly and hook then put the fuse tube into the bottom casting. At the end the 
assembler needs to center the fuse tube in relation to the top contact and the hooks.  
 Tables 3 to 7 demonstrate the responds to the questions in Table 2 that were asked in 
each respective work station (system) in order to investigate potential risks.  
4.1 Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 1 
 System 1 has been selected as it was recognized with high variability and low control 
characteristics, based on the discussion with quality engineers and the safety manager of the 
plant, which is confirmed by the responses to the question set 1 that are shown in Table 3. 
Responses to the question sets 2 and 3 provided data confirming that although it was expected to 
observe some functions that are introducing uncontrolled hazards, but the system performed as it 
was projected. The hazards that were documented during the interview had been recognized by 
the EHS (Environmental, Health and Safety) team.  
Question set 4 identified instantiations of the system and the sources of variability 
leading to resonant states. An example of this was the low training time that was dedicated to 
new employees and it resulted in numerous deviations and failures in static tests of units which 
are performed at the final stage of assembly. The most common reason of test failures was partial 
discharge. Partial Discharges (PD) are small electrical sparks that occur within the insulation of 
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medium and high voltage electrical assets. Partial Discharge occurs due to contamination by 
particles on the surface of insulating material. The lack of a proper training before performing 
the job may cause more contamination during the assembly process and result in more PD test 
failures. 
Table 3 - Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 1 
Objective Question Sets Response 
Work-as 
imagined 
1.  Are there any controlled documents 
to describe the job? 
1.   General work instructions but 
no specific one for each type of 
unit 
2.   Are the main factors of the job 
recognized? 
2.   All major steps are included in 
the instructions 
3.   Are there any prerequisites before 
starting the job? 
3.   Need to be trained on a 
particular station and they keep 
training logs 
4.   Are there any instructions for the 
changing conditions? 
4.   All changes go through the 
engineer change notice data to be 
approved in the house 
5.   Are there any controls applied to 
limit the deviation/variation? 
5.   Try to create gauges and 
fixtures to limit mechanical 
deviations in equipment but it is an 
ongoing process 
Work-as-done 1.   What is the best possible way to do 
the job? 
1.   The best way is the way they 
were trained 
2.   How close is the best way you do 
the job to the pre-employment training? 
2.   The training is very close to the 
best way that the job can be done 
3.   Has the team lead or supervisor 
enforced you to change the way you are 
doing the job? If so, how often? 
3.   Never be forced to have 
changed something 
4.   Has anything unpredicted ever 
happened? If so, explain it. 
4.   No unpredicted events 
happened. No surprises 
5.   Do you think that would be 
something beneficial to improve the 
work procedure? (By changing the 
material or the methods) 
5.   Nothing to improve 




7.   Is the material being used the best 
you have ever seen? (According to the 
previous changes) 
7.   Materials most of the time is 
good but it has changed slightly 
8.   How do you distinguish if the 
quality is acceptable? 
8.   Based on the cleanliness of the 
material and making sure 
everything has been done based on 
the instructions 
9.   Do you call the team lead whenever 
you detect a problem in the work or 
keep working until you they come to 
you? 




1.   Do you think there are any hazards 
that would hurt you? Are they 
recognized by the HSE team? 
1.    Cuts, scratches, bumping the 
head on the hanging equipment. 
Recognized by the EHS team 
2.    How is the severity of the hazard? 
 LOW - ‘‘Band-Aid type injuries” 
 MEDIUM - ‘‘A day off” 
 HIGH – ‘‘More than day off” 
2.  Low 
3.    How often does it happen? 
 Unlikely – “Less than one time in the 
past 3 years” 
 Possible – “One time in the last 
year” 
 Likely – “More than one time in the 
last year” 
3.  Likely 
4.    What are the controls used to 
lower the risks? 
4.    House-keeping, work station 
design, PPE 
FRAM/Safety-II 1.   How often does the process 
change due to the material/process 
issued? 
1.   No major change within the 5 
years 
2.    How do you select the 
employees? Tell me about the training 
and turnover. 
2.   Using temp agencies. Look for 
hands on skills. No set training 
time. Low turnover 
3.    When and why is a unit rejected? 3.   Rejected for static issues and 
test parameters failures 
4.    What is the most common reason 
to reject a unit? 
4.   Partial discharge 
5.    How would the potential hazards, 
due to the changes, be identified and 
controlled? 
5.   EHS review new equipment 
and it has to be approved by 
multiple people (change in process 
6.    Can you stop the running process 
in order to maintain an adjustment? 
6.   All the employees have the 
power to stop the process 
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7.    How do you manage an 
unexpected situation? 
7.   Usually EHS and engineering 
handle the situation based on the 
severity and the area of the job. 
8.    How long does it take to solve a 
problem? 
8.   Most of the time it takes 4 to 5 
hours to fix a problem (same day) 
 
4.2 Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 2 
Like System 1, System 2 has been selected as it was recognized with high variability and 
low control characteristics, based on the discussion with quality engineers and the safety 
manager of the plant, which is confirmed by the responses to the question set 1 that are shown in 
Table 4. Responses to the question sets 2 and 3 revealed information regarding to some actions 
that are not projected in work instructions and may introduce some hidden risks. In view of the 
fact that System 2 had only employed one universal work instructions with no details in 
description of the job, numerous actions were observed regarding to identification of variability. 
One example of this was the selection of the correct type of mold for the casting process. The 
operators who performed the mold build up job had been working at that position for over 30 
years and the selection process was merely based on the vast experience of those individuals. 
Again question set 4 identified instantiations of the system and the sources of variability 
leading to resonant states. The lack of an appropriate training process to train new and fresh 
employees along with the lack of a comprehensive work instructions that describe the job in 
details were discovered. The variability introduced by the lack of training would result in 




Table 4 - Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 2 
Objective Question Sets Response 
Work-as 
imagined 
1.  Are there any controlled documents 
to describe the job? 
1.   There is general instruction but no 
specific style instruction for each unit  
2.   Are the main factors of the job 
recognized? 
2.   No. Trying to implement a 
program per station to highlight the 
key process  
3.   Are there any prerequisites before 
starting the job? 
3.   Need to be trained on a particular 
station and they keep training logs 
4.   Are there any instructions for the 
changing conditions? 
4.   All changes go through the 
engineer change notice data to be 
approved in the house 
5.   Are there any controls applied to 
limit the deviation/variation? 
5.   There is an established process to 
control deviation 
Work-as-done 
1.   What is the best possible way to do 
the job? 
1.      No special training. Perform the 
job based on the remarkable 
experience 
2.   How close is the best way you do 
the job to the pre-employment training? 
2.   Training is inadequate 
3.   Has the team lead or supervisor 
enforced you to change the way you are 
doing the job? If so, how often? 
3.   Workers are more experienced 
than supervisors in order to identify 
the errors 
4.   Has anything unpredicted ever 
happened? If so, explain it. 
4.   No real supervises rather than 
come machine errors 
5.   Do you think that would be 
something beneficial to improve the 
work procedure? (By changing the 
material or the methods) 
5.   Add more work space and some 
features 
6.   Are the tools a right fit to the job? 
6.   Tools are good but should be 
borrowed rarely 
7.   Is the material being used the best 
you have ever seen? (According to the 
previous changes) 
7.   Cheaper materials are being used 
recently 
8.   How do you distinguish if the 
quality is acceptable? 
8.   Based on the appearance of the 
unit and the correctness of the 
terminals 
9.   Do you call the team lead whenever 
you detect a problem in the work or 
keep working until you they come to 
you? 
9.   Sometimes call supervisors but 
most of the time tag the unit and send 
it back to fix the problem that has 





1.   Do you think there are any hazards 
that would hurt you? Are they 
recognized by the HSE team? 
1.   Cuts, pinches, tool injuries 
2.    How is the severity of the hazard? 
 LOW - ‘‘Band-Aid type injuries” 
 MEDIUM - ‘‘A day off” 
 HIGH – ‘‘More than day off” 




3.    How often does it happen? 
 Unlikely – “Less than one time in 
the past 3 years” 
 Possible – “One time in the last 
year” 
 Likely – “More than one time in the 
last year” 




4.    What are the controls used to lower 
the risks? 
4.    PPE and lifting crane 
FRAM/Safety-II 
1.   How often does the process change 
due to the material/process issued? 
1.   No major change within the 30 
years 
2.    How do you select the employees? 
Tell me about the training and turnover.  
2.   Using temp agencies. Hire tall 
men. On the job training up to 
4months. Very low turnover 
3.    When and why is a unit rejected? 
3.   Rejected for bad serial number 
and bad terminals 
4.    What is the most common reason to 
reject a unit? 
4.   Bad terminal and sleeve part left 
5.    How would the potential hazards, 
due to the changes, be identified and 
controlled? 
5.   EHS review new equipment and it 
has to be approved by multiple 
people (change in process) 
6.    Can you stop the running process in 
order to maintain an adjustment? 
6.   Have power to stop the process 
7.    How do you manage an unexpected 
situation? 
7.   Based on the severity call 
supervisor or handle the situation 
8.    How long does it take to solve a 
problem? 
8.   Typically, same day. If engineers 





4.3 Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 3 
System 3 has been selected as it was recognized with low variability and high control 
characteristics, based on the discussion with quality engineers and the safety manager of the 
plant, which is confirmed by the responses to the question set 1 that are shown in Table 5. 
Responses to the question sets 2 and 3 provided data confirming that the job is highly controlled 
and the variability is extremely low. The only issue that the workers mentioned during the 
interviews was minor spots on some steels which was due to the inconsistency in the production 
of the stock materials. Based on the size of the spots, some may result in the rejection of the 
assembly and some may not. Moreover, the observation of the job confirmed that all functions 
present a highly controlled operation with a minor unrecognized hazard by the EHS team. 
Question set 4 identified minor instantiations of the system and the sources of variability 
leading to resonant states. Again like System 1 and System 2, the lack of a proper training time 
was identified by the question set 4. However, the fact that the job has a high level of control by 





Table 5 - Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 3 
Objective Question Sets Response 
Work-as imagined 1.  Are there any controlled documents 
to describe the job? 
1.      Available work 
instruction with description of 
the job 
2.   Are the main factors of the job 
recognized? 
2.   All major steps are 
included in the instructions 
and also in quality control 
instructions 
3.   Are there any prerequisites before 
starting the job? 
3.   Cross training from other 
jobs and initial quality control 
4.   Are there any instructions for the 
changing conditions? 
4.   Using engineering notice 
5.   Are there any controls applied to 
limit the deviation/variation? 
5.   Control the process by 
using engineering approval 
before applying any change 
Work-as-done 1.   What is the best possible way to do 
the job? 
1.   The best way is the way 
they were trained 
2.   How close is the best way you do 
the job to the pre-employment 
training? 
2.   The training is very close 
to the best way that the job 
can be done 
3.   Has the team lead or supervisor 
enforced you to change the way you 
are doing the job? If so, how often? 
3.   No force from team leads 
to change the process 
4.   Has anything unpredicted ever 
happened? If so, explain it. 
4.   No unpredicted events 
happened except the 
machine’s gauge issues 
5.   Do you think that would be 
something beneficial to improve the 
work procedure? (By changing the 
material or the methods) 
5.   By not having to take the 
components apart (Was 
projected in work 
instructions) 
6.   Are the tools a right fit to the job? 6.   No specific tools are used 
(except the machine) 
7.   Is the material being used the best 
you have ever seen? (According to the 
previous changes) 
7.   Rivets usually have some 
issues 
8.   How do you distinguish if the 
quality is acceptable? 
8.   The shape and cleanliness 
9.   Do you call the team lead 
whenever you detect a problem in the 
work or keep working until you they 
come to you? 
9.   Call coworkers or 
maintenance 
Risk Matrix/Safety-I 1.   Do you think there are any hazards 
that would hurt you? Are they 
recognized by the HSE team? 
1.   Fibers particles get into 
the gloves and makes 
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scratches. Not recognized by 
the EHS team 
2.    How is the severity of the hazard? 
 LOW - ‘‘Band-Aid type injuries” 
 MEDIUM - ‘‘A day off” 
 HIGH – ‘‘More than day off” 
 2.    Low 
  
  
3.    How often does it happen? 
 Unlikely – “Less than one time in the 
past 3 years” 
 Possible – “One time in the last year” 
 Likely – “More than one time in the 
last year” 
 3.    Likely 
  
  
4.    What are the controls used to 
lower the risks? 
4.    PPE 
FRAM/Safety-II 1.   How often does the process change 
due to the material/process issued? 
1.   The changes are just types 
of the units 
2.    How do you select the employees? 
Tell me about the training and 
turnover.  
2.   Using temp agencies. 
Training is on the job and 
very short. Low turnover 
3.    When and why is a unit rejected? 3.   When blades or pins are 
damaged 
4.    What is the most common reason 
to reject a unit? 
4.   Pin damage 
5.    How would the potential hazards, 
due to the changes, be identified and 
controlled? 
5.   EHS review new 
equipment and it has to be 
approved by multiple people 
(change in process 
6.    Can you stop the running process 
in order to maintain an adjustment? 
6.   Can stop the process 
7.    How do you manage an 
unexpected situation? 
7.   Unexpected situations are 
handled by maintenance and 
coworkers 
8.    How long does it take to solve a 
problem? 





4.4 Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 4 
Like System 3, System 4 has been selected as it was recognized with low variability and 
high control characteristics, based on the discussion with quality engineers and the safety 
manager of the plant, which is confirmed by the responses to the question set 1 that are shown in 
Table 6. Responses to the question sets 2 and 3 provided data confirming that the job is highly 
controlled and the variability is extremely low. Two issues were mentioned during the interviews 
by the workers. The first one was some alignments in the process of the assembly that were time 
consuming when they try to place fuse tubes. The assemblers might miss the cycle time but there 
is no force from the supervisors to ignore the alignment in order to keep the cycle time. The 
second issue that the workers mentioned during the interview was the location of the parts. The 
assemblers need to walk around the working table in order to reach to the parts they need to 
assemble the unit. They suggested that if the location of the parts was closer the them, they 
would save more time and energy. Moreover, the observation of the job confirmed that all 
functions present a highly controlled operation with some unrecognized hazards by the EHS 
team. 
Question set 4 identified instantiations of the system and the sources of variability 
leading to resonant states. Again like System 1, 2 and 3, the lack of a proper training time was 
identified by the question set 4. Moreover, the workers had some suggestions in order to improve 
the job performance in spite the fact that the job was highly controlled and the gap between the 




Table 6 - Summaries of responses to the questions for the System 4 
Objective Question Sets Response 
Work-as imagined 1.  Are there any controlled documents 
to describe the job? 
1.      The work instructions 
are available 
2.   Are the main factors of the job 
recognized? 
2.      All major steps are 
included in the instructions 
and also in quality control 
instructions 
3.   Are there any prerequisites before 
starting the job? 
3.      Cross training from 
other jobs and initial quality 
control 
4.   Are there any instructions for the 
changing conditions? 
4.      Using engineering 
notice 
5.   Are there any controls applied to 
limit the deviation/variation? 
5.      Control the process by 
using engineering approval 
before applying any change 
Work-as-done 1.   What is the best possible way to do 
the job? 
1.   The best way is the 
training’s way 
2.   How close is the best way you do 
the job to the pre-employment 
training? 
2.   The training is very close 
to the best way of doing the 
job, with small differences 
3.   Has the team lead or supervisor 
enforced you to change the way you 
are doing the job? If so, how often? 
3.   The only change is the 
order change 
4.   Has anything unpredicted ever 
happened? If so, explain it. 
4.   Nothing unpredicted has 
happened 
5.   Do you think that would be 
something beneficial to improve the 
work procedure? (By changing the 
material or the methods) 
5.   Changing the work set up 
in order to avoid heavy lifting 
and long walks 
6.   Are the tools a right fit to the job? 6.   Tools and materials are fit 
7.   Is the material being used the best 
you have ever seen? (According to the 
previous changes) 
7.   Squares breaks frequently 
8.   How do you distinguish if the 
quality is acceptable? 
8.   The shape and cleanliness 
9.   Do you call the team lead 
whenever you detect a problem in the 
work or keep working until you they 
come to you? 
9.   Call coworkers or 
maintenance 
Risk Matrix/Safety-I 1.   Do you think there are any hazards 
that would hurt you? Are they 
recognized by the HSE team? 
1.      Heavy lifting, cuts, 
pinches and hammer/drill 
injuries. Not recognized by 
the EHS team 
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2.    How is the severity of the hazard? 
 LOW - ‘‘Band-Aid type injuries” 
 MEDIUM - ‘‘A day off” 
 HIGH – ‘‘More than day off” 




3.    How often does it happen? 
 Unlikely – “Less than one time in the 
past 3 years” 
 Possible – “One time in the last year” 
 Likely – “More than one time in the 
last year” 




4.    What are the controls used to 
lower the risks? 
4.    PPE and drill/driver ergo 
hanging rope 
FRAM/Safety-II 1.   How often does the process change 
due to the material/process issued? 
1.   The changes on the units 
happen multiple times per 
day 
2.    How do you select the employees? 
Tell me about the training and 
turnover.  
2.   Using temp agencies. 
Training is on the job and 
very short. Low turnover 
3.    When and why is a unit rejected? 3.   When they find rust and 
tarnished spots on the parts 
4.    What is the most common reason 
to reject a unit? 
4.   Rust 
5.    How would the potential hazards, 
due to the changes, be identified and 
controlled? 
5.   EHS review new 
equipment and it has to be 
approved by multiple people 
(change in process 
6.    Can you stop the running process 
in order to maintain an adjustment? 
6.   Can stop the process 
7.    How do you manage an 
unexpected situation? 
7.   Unexpected situations are 
handled by stopping the 
process and calling the team 
leader 
8.    How long does it take to solve a 
problem? 
8.   Are solved at the same 





As it was explained in the methodology section in detail, the question sets that have been 
asked in this research was created based on a semi-structured interview process for three major 
reasons: (i) to avoid the potential poor response (Austin, 1981), (ii) to have the opportunity to 
evaluate the validity of the respondent’s answers by observing non-verbal indicators such as 
facial expressions, postures, hand gestures and in general body language (Gordon, 1975), (iii) to 
simulate the real time risk assessment on the job (Albery, et al., 2016) . During the research, the 
questioning style of the both interviewer and the second coder was matured as the 
understandings of the systems and interactions between the researcher and employers developed. 
The questions illustrated in Table 2 were applied to investigate each system for each objective of 
the research in order to preserve consistency.  
 The first set of questions satisfies the first objective of the research which is to explore 
how the work is imagined and provides data that describes each system comprehensively. It 
looks at the job from a top-down perspective in order to discover how detailed the jobs are 
described (Silbey, 2009). Responses to the questions below helped to obtain sufficient data that 
is needed to recognize the systems as they are described. Furthermore, observation of the 
systems provided data regarding to the level and number of controls that were used in order to 
control the risks that are associated with the identified hazards (Lundberg, et al., 2009). 
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 “Are the main factors of the job recognized?” 
 “Are there any perquisites before starting the job?” 
 “Are there any controls applied to limit the deviation/variation?” 
The second set of questions satisfies the second objective of the research which is to 
explore how the work is done. The narratives of the questions are opposite of the first set of 
questions. It reversely looks at the job from a bottom-up perspective in order to discover the 
hidden sides of the job that are not described in work instructions (Silbey, 2009). Considering the 
first and second sets of questions side by side, it can be discovered that different stakeholders 
possess different views within the system and it can be intensified when the job becomes more 
detailed and more complicated (Lundberg et al., 2009). The amount of variability in all four 
systems was different. System 1 and 2 were selected with high variability and low control 
characteristics and it was expected to identify high amount of variability. Ironically, a low 
amount of variability was observed within System 1 while System 2 introduced a high amount of 
variability. System 3 and 4 were selected with low variability and high control characteristics 
that was confirmed by the first set of questions. Both System 3 and 4 introduced a very low 
amount of variability with minor interventions that were used to achieve the work objectives. 
The amount and level of variability were determined when workers were asked the questions, 
 “Do you think that would be something beneficial to improve the work procedure?” 
 “What is the best possible way to do the job?” 
In most cases the responses proved that there was not a high amount of activities to 
suggest in order to improve the work situation. Only in System 2 numerous hidden activities 
were identified that the workers were performing in order to achieve the system goals. Also in 
System 4 a low level of variability was observed that was due to the work set up and not the 
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current processes. All in all, the documentation and controls were aligned with work-as-imagined 
in most cases (Lundberg et al., 2009) 
 
 The third set of questions was applied to merely look at the systems from the traditional 
risk assessment point of view using a risk matrix approach. The questions were arranged to 
identify uncontrolled hazards or by other words the actual variability that are not described. The 
responses to these questions confirmed the presence of some uncontrolled hazards. The two 
questions,  
 “Do you think there are any hazards that would hurt you? Are they recognized by the 
HSE team?”  
 “What are the controls used to lower the risks?”  
encouraged the workers to start an open discussion and tell about the hazards associated with 
their activities. Moreover, they were asked to state whether the mentioned hazards identified by 
the EHS team or not in order to recognize if the current controls that were applied are enough to 
lower the risks. Also the frequency and severity of the hazards were measured based on the 
discussion with the workers and observation of the job cycle. A full cycle of the job was 
observed then evidence of the frequency and severity of the hazards was revealed based on the 
items the workers have to perform in order to complete a task. Additionally, an open narrative 
with the workers about the possible hazards that they would face when performing the job 
confirmed the observations.  
Lunderberg et al., (2010) demonstrated in his research that Safety-I style linear action-
consequence risk assessment reveals a lower order control of hazards since it does not investigate 
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the deeper systemic problems which have roots in other areas and do not instantly affect the 
system. Having the third question set been conducted in isolation would have not been efficient 
enough because it cannot have the systems examined beyond the hazards (due to a lack of a 
deeper understanding of the system) and consequently it cannot recognize the hazards that the 
workers were been exposed to when maintaining the success of the system. 
Although the traditional Safety-I risk assessment approach (risk matrix) does not 
investigate the deeper systemic problems, the last set of questions develops the required variety 
of the risk assessment which are needed in order to have the system examined beyond the 
hazards. As it was mentioned earlier in the previous paragraph regarding to the third question set, 
if this question set had been in isolation, the sufficient data that are needed to identify intonations 
would have not been yielded (Ashby, 1956).  
The fourth question set was set to satisfy the fourth objective of the research which is to 
investigate the validity of the hazards, associated with linear risk assessment methods, mitigation 
using the Safety-II perspectives (Albery et al., 2016). Accordingly, the two questions,  
 “How do you select the employees? Tell me about the training and turnover” 
 “What is the most common reason to reject a unit?”  
played a crucial role in the transition from the traditional Safety-I approach to the newly 
proposed approach, Safety-II. Therefore, the fourth question set created the opportunity to 
recognize the states in which the systems resonate and provided the appropriate adjustments in 
order to lower the risks of undesired events (Hollnagel et al., 2014). 
The responses to the fourth set of questions revealed the significant learnings that were 
generated with each instantiation. The instantiations identified variabilities that were not created 
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by the upstream processes but by the other parts of the system which were not immediately 
related to the process. Subsequently, reactive variability was observed in which the employees 
altered the conditions in order to create an environment that maintains the desired outcomes. By 
other words, the employees adjusted the conditions in order to still produce a successful product 
Therefore, the adoption to the new condition that was generated by the variability, may lead to 
creation of hazards to workers and other employees. This adoption also results in some quality 
failures as instantiations introduce more variability (Dekker, 2006). 
As it was mentioned in the methodology section, the objectives of this research are set in 
order to create a learning cycle. The double-loop learning happens when mismatches are 
corrected by first investigating and altering the primary variables and then by the actions. The 
linear action-consequence relationships of the traditional Safety-I risk assessment is opposed to 
the perspective provided by the FRAM approach in which evaluates each of the systems’ goals 
individually (Albery et al., 2016). This double-loop learning found in Figure 10 below helped the 
researcher to identify the higher controls in each system that mitigate the unwanted hazards then 
reduce the reactive adjustments that were to dampen the variabilities in order to maintain success 
of the system (Dekker, 2006). As Gadd et al., (2004) stated, this process is required by the 
participation of all stakeholders who are the important component of the entire process. Thus, 
participation of all stakeholders was crucial in order to achieve the following goals:   
 To understand the functions of each system that performs and also the interactions 
with the other systems 
 To understand the sources of variabilities and the steps that should be taken in 
order to dampen the variabilities effectively  
77 
 
 To ensure that all stakeholders participate in the development of the narratives 
and consequently learning (Albery et al., 2016) 
 
 




Are the main factors of the job recognized? 
Are there any perquisites before starting the job? 
Are there any controls applied to limit the deviation/variation? 
Work-as-done  What is the best possible way to do the job? 





5. Do you think there are any hazards that would hurt you? Are they 
recognized by the HSE team? 

















9. How do you select the employees? Tell me about the training and turnover 
10. What is the most common reason to reject a unit? 
 
 
A risk assessment that uses all the four question sets presented in Table 2 has involved 
more number of resource involvement, thus result in an enhanced understanding of the systems 
which is more comprehensive and deeper. Using only the subset of questions illustrated in the 
third object, which was implement of Safety-I traditional risk assessment, cannot provide 
sufficient data regarding to understanding of the systems and identifications beyond the hazards. 
In order to obtain such understandings that know each systems and their internal and external 
interactions, it was required to practice the new perspective in safety that is Safety-II. The 
question set presented in Table 7 may yield the same result as it was found in this research. 
Based on the findings of this research, the questions stated in Table 7 required a shorter dialogs 
and thus narratives which need less time and resource cost than the full question sets presented in 
Table 2. Therefore, using shorter question sets will propose an efficient tool of risk assessment 
for future studies which uses as less as possible resources but presents a great image of the 
system that is needed to comprehend it (Albery et al., 2016). 
 Again as it was mentioned earlier in the methodology section, the purpose of this 
research is not to constitute FRAM models hence it is another project by itself and is out of the 
scope of this research. Thus, neither the question sets presented in Table 2 nor Table 7 constitute 
FRAM models. However, the narratives that were developed during the interviews provided 
sufficient background data that is required to implement a full FRAM assessment. Furthermore, 
as one of this study’s objectives was to investigate the validity of the research conducted by 
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Albery at al., (2016), an approximately small number of participants were selected in order to 
maintain the same sample size but in a different industry. Still, this research was conducted in a 
course of six consecutive weeks hence the process of directing the interviews and data saturating 
were extremely time consuming. Although, employing a greater sample size needs enormous 
resources, but it may provide an opportunity for further studies to understand if there is 
consistency in these research findings by increasing the sample size. The Albery’s study and this 
research both were conducted in manufacturing areas, one in the automotive industry and the 
other in the electrical equipment productions industry. Further concentration would be on 
investigation of other industries such as aviation and construction. It may benefit to identify 





 Safety cannot be guaranteed only by reacting based on a simple cause and effect 
relationships. It is equally important to anticipate, to identify potential new risks, and then to 
create barriers against them. Westrum (2006) projected a distinction between regular threats, 
irregular threats, and unexampled events. Regular threats are events that occur frequently and 
systems could damp them by standard responses. Irregular threats are infrequent events where 
their total number makes it practically impossible to provide a standard response. Although they 
are imaginable, they are typically unexpected. Finally, unexampled events are those that are 
virtually impossible to imagine and which exceed the responders’ collective experience. In this 
research, it was demonstrated that some irregular events cannot be treated by the traditional 
perspectives. In other words, they cannot easily be described by the linear types of risk 
assessment approaches such as risk matrices. Indeed, they seem to emerge out of a situation 
(Hollnagel et al., 2006). Questions inspired by the concept of the FRAM and Safety-II 
(Hollnagel, 2014) encouraged stakeholders to discover sources of variability within their 
working systems and by creating such an environment, the adequate data that describe the 
systems in detail was provided.  
 It was also found that using this complementary approach, inquiring four sets of 
questions, can provide a better understanding of systems in which total systems were considered 
in addition to the hazards and their controls, thus safety and productivity were assessed as one 
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activity. In comparison to risk matrix assessments which only focus on the hazards, their direct 
consequences and their controls (Albery, at al., 2016).  
  In reality, workers learn to overcome design flaws, poor planning, and functional bugs 
because they can recognize the actual demands and adjust their performance accordingly, and 
because they can interpret and apply procedures to match the conditions. Relating to the 
responses to the question sets, it was found that in each of the systems investigated, although 
work-as-done was not very different from work-as-imagined, but they introduced some 
variabilities which was not distinguishable through the traditional risk assessment, Safety-I/Risk 
Matrix. Organizational flaws were detected within the responses to the questions which raised 
the red flags regarding to the dedicated training time before allocating the jobs. As it was noted 
in literature review section, safety currently exists in the management age and it was 
demonstrated by numerous studies how organizationally based interventions can improve safety 
performance or at least the intermediate changes which it will lead to that. Among the 
organizationally based interventions, training is at the best necessary and a lack of appropriate 
training may resonate within the systems and result in undesired events (Hale et al., 2010). Lack 
of training time before starting the job was not an element that can be simply identified by linear 
approach risk assessment. It means that solutions lie in understanding of systemic resolutions 
through collaboration with all stakeholders which result in seeing beyond the avoidance of only 
limited hazards that exist merely in each system.  
 Furthermore, although the Safety-II approach question sets needed greater resources than 
traditional risk matrix in order to develop the descriptions of the systems, this perspective 
absolutely is required in order to enhance the requisite variety because only developed narratives 
82 
 
can provide a comprehensive understanding of system performance in the management of 
variability.  
 Currently this research is the second study in the field of application of newly proposed 
perspective in safety, Safety-II. The research was faced with the substantial lack of literature 
about this topic. The book, Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management, 
was the only book written by Erik Hollnagel in 2014 about Safety-II and the other related articles 
were abstractions or shares of this book that were written either by Hollnagel independently or 
with his collaborations. The researcher assures that the literature review was all-inclusive of the 
articles about this novel research inquiry, as it was the main obstacle of this study. Additionally, 
these conclusions are limited to the sample size which was set approximately close to the 
original study conducted by Albery, et al., (2016) in order to investigate the validation of it in 
other industries. The findings of this research is also limited to the systems that were selected for 
this research; however, the presented findings show that other variabilities may exist in all of the 
other systems that were not investigated. Additionally, based on the findings of this research, it 
may be beneficial to extend this proposed method to a greater sample size and other industries in 
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The dialogs between the interviewer and interviewees sorted by the objectives of the research 





Responses for the systems 
1&2 (MV Assembly, Mold 
build up/ Casting)  
 
with 3 years’ experience 
 We have general work instruction and control document 
data base for all the systems (specifically for the new section 
added to the plant, Outdoor products) but no specific one to 
describe every details for every single unit. 
 All major steps are included and the quality documents are 
inclusive of all the major keys as well. 
 The prerequisite of starting a job is the need to be trained on 
a particular station then supervisors should keep the training 
logs 
 All changes must go through the engineer change notice 
data then need to be approved in the house before taking any 
actions 
 The current control for limiting the deviations is the things 
the quality people do but we are trying to create gauges and 
fixtures to limit mechanical deviations in equipment but it is 




Responses for the systems 
3&4 (Cutout Pre and Final 
Assembly) 
  
with 3 years’ experience 
 Yes. There is control document, general checklists and notes 
on a control document data base with multiple types based 
on the units. They are described from start to finish based on 
the process, components needed and the methods used. 
 No. Trying to implement a program per station to highlight 
the key process to help guide employees as they work. 
(They have got approved but not implemented) 
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 On the jobs training. They have made cross training from 
the other jobs. 
They have initial for incoming parts. If they pass it 
constantly they discontinue the inspection. 
 Deviation are used. If safe, still allow jobs to work but 
require engineering notices. 
 All statistical inferences and information is attained through 
scrap number. 





System 1 (MV Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The best way is the way we are trained. No deviation I have 
seen 
 I had training that is the exact way I am doing now. I have 
been trained to do multiple jobs. 
 No force from supervisor to change the process other than 
the product change 
 Nothing unpredicted ever happened  
 I love the way I am doing my job. No recommendation to 
change anything. 
 Tools are fit and I think they are good enough 
 Material are always good and I have no idea to have them 
differently. 
 Based on the cleanliness of the material. It is always good. 
 We ask team leader then if she/he is not available, ask the 
supervisor. 




System 1 (MV Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 She prefers the training methods as the best way doing her 




 She had never been forced to change something except the 
unit change which is very normal. 
 Working procedure changes during the trial. 
 No unpredicted changes or surprises. 
 She has nothing to say about the potential improvements. 
 The tools have some minor maintenance problem but she 
said it is not a big deal. Some tools are wear out. 
 She has limited knowledge about the changes in the quality 
of the materials but she has noticed the changes. 
 She makes sure everything is done based on she is trained. 
Nothing than quality other than her normal task. 
 Yes, they call team leader and supervisors. 
Worker #1 
 
System 2 (Mold 
Buildup/Casting) 
 
With 37 years’ experience 
 There is a simple training on the computer but it is not good 
enough. I have got very short training from an engineer when 
I got hire 37 years ago.  
 No changes form the supervisors and also no change in the 
procedures has happened. 
 I cannot say any real surprises rather than machine errors 
which happened rarely. 
 He is happy with the current procedures. 
 Tools should sometimes have borrowed but most of the time 
is good. 
 The quality of the material should be better. I can say the 
cheaper materials are being used now to cut the costs.  
 Wherever he gets a problem he intercoms to call some 
engineer (rarely happens) 
Worker #2 
 
System 2 (Mold 
Buildup/Casting) 
 
With 37 years’ experience 
 He has always done this job like this and there is no work 
instruction to follow if someone else wants to do the job. 
 Training is bad. There is no mentorship and also no 
shadowing is involved. 
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 The leaders are less authorized than them in case of making 
any change because they are more experienced and have 
been working at the plant very longer. 
 No surprise has happened. No shocking event. The surprise 
would be (not for us) putting different leads into different 
blocks which may happen if you are new and not very 
familiar how to do the job 
 He would add more work space and remove the steel plate 
at top of the working station in terms of making 
improvements. 
 The quality is below average, currently. They use cheap 
metals to cut the costs. 
 Tools are good. Everybody has a toolbox and I have no 
issue with it. 
 Lots of time they handle the issue on their own but 
sometimes they call supervisors. 
 They tag the unit and fix the problem and send it back. 
Worker #1 
 
System 3 (Cutouts Pre 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The best possible way is the way they were trained. It was 
on the job training and there is no working instruction. 
 I have no experience to be forced to change the way I am 
doing my job. 
 The machine sometimes has gauge issues but no surprises 
other than that.  
 Making the process easier by not taking components apart 
(She needs to take some parts apart before doing some work 
on it). 
 No tools are involved (except that machine). 




 If everything goes well, it will be nothing to be worry 
except the shape and cleanliness of the part. 
 She usually calls coworkers or maintenance (but not 
supervisor or team leader) in case of seeing problems. 
 She has enough time to stop the work if she sees a problem, 




System 3 (Cutouts Pre 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The best way to do the job is the same as the training. The 
training is very close to the best way of doing the job.  
 The only change is when the product type changes (changes 
in model/type). 
 She has never seen anything unpredicted. 
 She was hired 2 months ago and is very new. She doesn’t 
have enough information about the changes in material and 
improvements. 
 The tools are good enough (she doesn’t use so many tools). 
Few tools are needed for her tasks. 
 Not enough experience to give material information (limited 
knowledge) 
 In case of any problem she calls the team leader or 
coworker. She prefers to not talk to the supervisor directly.  
 She has enough time to stop the work if anything abnormal 




System 4 (Cutouts Final 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The best possible way to do the job is the way that she got 
from her team leader when she moved to this job. 
 It is close to the training but there is a little difference. 
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 She has not been forced to any changes because of the way 
she is doing the job.  
 No unpredicted situations happened before (At least I have 
not seen). 
 She would change the work set up if she wants to improve 
her working condition. So she would not have to walk to get 
the unit to her table.  
 Tools and materials are good (limited knowledge on 
material) 
 If there is a problem, she calls the team leader. She has time 
but not enough because the process is always is going (It 




System 4 (Cutouts Final 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The way that she was trained is the best way of doing the 
job. 
 The training is so close to the best possible way of doing the 
job. 
 They update and change parts but it is rare and the whole 
process is always the same.  
 The supervisor only changes the procedure when orders are 
changed. 
 She would change the way the parts come to her to avoid 
heavy lifting and long walks. It helps to be faster and save 
time. 
 Tools are good and she has no complaints about the tools. 
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 Sometimes squares (the brackets in the units) break and 
causes to reject the unit. She thinks the quality of squares 
can be better.  
 She calls the team leader for big issues but small ones are 
handled by coworkers (problems are rare) 
 She has limited time to get the problems solved but she is 






System 1 (MV Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Cuts, scratches, bumping the head on the hanging equipment. 
I have minor ergonomics muscle issues but I have had it from 
my another job. 
 Low  
 Likely 
 Only controls are work station design and mandatory PPE. 
Worker #2 
 
System 1 (MV Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Cuts and scratches. EHS knows about and they are good in 
keep up with caring stuff. 
 Low 
 Possible 
 Controls are: house-keeping and PPE 
Worker #1 
 
System 2 (Mold 
Buildup/Casting) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Pinch points when using automatic tools, cuts and scratches. 
yeah, EHS has recognized what is going on here. 
 Medium 
 Unlikely 
 PPE, Crane for lifting 
Worker #2 
 
System 2 (Mold 
Buildup/Casting) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Cuts, pinches, tool injuries are the most common hazards 
 Low 
 Unlikely 






System 3 (Cutouts Pre 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 She sees no uncontrolled hazards. The machine is equipped 
with the double-bottom control switch in order to prevent 
crush hazards  
 Low 
 Unlikely 
 The control is the double-bottom control switch 
Worker #2 
 
System 3 (Cutouts Pre 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Fibers get into the gloves and makes scratches. It is not 






System 4 (Cutouts Final 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 




 Controls are PPE (gloves and goggles) 
Worker #2 
 
System 4 (Cutouts Final 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Heavy lifting, cuts, pinches and hammer/drill injuries are 
the hazards.  
 Low 
 Unlikely 







System 1 (MV Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 No changes within the 5 years has happened. I cannot say 
any major change. 
 No knowledge of process of hiring and how often they 
change the employees. But the turnover is very low (there is 
people have been working since 1970’s). 
 When the coils won’t connect/fit and physical defects on 
materials are found.  
 Most common is the coil is not connected. 
 Yes, we are always being encouraged to stop the work by the 
supervisors if there is unusual. 
 She stops work, meet with team leader and have discussion. 
 Based on the severity. Mostly the problems are fixed in the 
same day but sometimes it takes longer. 
Worker #2 
 
System 1 (MV Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Changes are once a month but it is very minor.  
 No selection process is out there to elect the new employees. 
I was told to do this job and the training was just on the job 
and very short. The turnover is very low. At least I cannot 
say that. 
 When the serial number don’t match, when the padding is 
messed up, when the coils don’t match and when the sleeves 
are left off. 
 Sleeve (small metal at the bottom) left off is the most 
happened one. 
 We are being encouraged to stop the work when adjustment 
is necessary. 
 We handle the unusual events by stopping the work and 
going to the team leader and discuss the issue.  





System 2 (Mold 
Buildup/Casting) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Process doesn’t change.  
 For this area supervisors hire higher men typically and if 
someone wants to take my job, the training process will be 
up to 4 months. 
 We reject the units when they have tickets, serial number or 
bad terminals issues. 
 The most common is bad terminal issue. 
 We all have the power to stop the process (only three persons 
do this job). 
 The unpredicted issues are solved based on the severity. We 
either handle the situation by ourselves (most of the times) or 
call the supervisor. 
 Typically, same day or few days but when engineers are 
involved it takes longer. 
Worker #2 
 
System 2 (Mold 
Buildup/Casting) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The process has been always the same and there are no 
changes except few changes in the workstation design 
because of the changing the layout of the plant. 
 The training procedure is so bad. There is no selection based 
on the mechanical skills. They only hire based on the 
physical abilities. Also turnover is low  
 When making mistake in the selection of the molds. Each 
unit has specific mold that should be used for casting.  
Physical damage and wrong serial numbers are the next 
problems.   
 Physical damage and serial number issues are the most 
common causes.  
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 They are allowed to stop the work in case of failure 
detection. 
 They handle lots of issues by their own but if there is 
something. with machineries, they call maintenance. 




System 3 (Cutouts Pre 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Only changes that have been happened are in products. Such 
as tube changes. 
 She came from another line and got training in few minutes. 
So the training is very short and easy. 
 She thinks the turnover is very low.  
 Units are rejected when blades or pins are damaged. 
 Pin damage is the most common on.e 
 She has the power to stop the process. 
 She prefers to handle unexpected situations by maintenance 
and coworkers. She rarely goes to the supervisor for the 
technical problems. 
 Problems are solved very quick, like one to three hours. 
Worker #2 
 
System 3 (Cutouts Pre 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 The changes in the process happen when the types of units 
change. 
 Her training was just one day. She is very new but she thinks 
turnover is low. 
 She has been trained to reject units whenever she sees rusts, 
holes and deformities on the parts. 
 The most common reason to reject is rust. 
 She knows that she has the power to stop the process when a 
problem pops up. 
 When she sees a problem she handles the situation by 
stopping the work and getting the team leader. 
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System 4 (Cutouts Final 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 She cannot call it change in the process because units and 
products change all the time and it is part of the process to 
have different types of units assembled.  
 She has not had any particular skills for this job and she just 
placed at this position. 
 Training was two weeks before starting this job. She was at 
an easier job before starting this job. 
 The turnover is low for this department.  
 Rejections come from rust and tarnished spots. 
 Rust is the most common. 
 Unexpected situations are being handled by stopping the 
work and going to the team leader. 
 Problems are solved at the same day and she would say 
pretty quick most of the time. 
Worker #2 
 
System 4 (Cutouts Final 
Assembly) 
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Changes on units happen multiple times per day. 
 She got to this position from another position and the training 
was only one week (on the job training). She thinks the 
whole area has low turnover. 
 Rejections come from rust, missing contacts and chipped 
tubes. 
 The most common reason that makes to reject a unit is rust. 
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 She has the power to stop the process in case of a problem. 
 She stops the process and call a coworker or a team leader 
for unexpected situations. 
 Small problems are solved at the same day while big issues 
take couple of days (never longer than one week). 
Quality Engineer #1 
 
Responses for the systems 
1&2 (MV Assembly, Mold 
build up/ Casting)  
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 Lots of old designs from 1980s and prior that. The process 
changes occur annually at a minimum. 
 Training should be more detailed. They just see who “catches 
on” and quick then hanging them to get trained. 
 The overall turnover at the plant is high but in assembly is 
not too bad. 
 Units are being rejected based on the preliminary testing and 
workmanship at nearly all stages before to catch molding and 
final stages. surface voids and soft mix are other issues. 
 Partial discharge failure, over voltage test failure and 
insulation test failure are the most common issues. 
 Has hazards at all stages but main one is cut and the dropping 
product. Mold release spray cans usage and there is no 
ventilation (It is supposed to brush it on) 
 We are trying to implement FMEA studies at the design 
stages before addition or changes in new equipment happen. 
 Yes. Stop the line on situational basis (severity) 
 By ensuring all important people involved immediately to 
troubleshoot the problem. 
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 Depends on severity. Try to solve in a day but sometime few 
months. Put some temporary fix to solve it systematically.  
 
Quality Engineer #2 
 
Responses for the systems 
3&4 (Cutouts Pre and Final 
Assembly)  
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 They practice continuous improvement so it is always 
changing. 
 They hire from temp agencies and distribute from physical 
capabilities and background. No established training but 
supervisor do it by their own. 
 External hardware damage, terminal breaks are also the main 
causes. 
 The largest major cause is the breaking parts during the 
assembly. 
 Heavy lifting, pinching and repetitive motions. They are 
recognized (with thinking). 
 They work with manufacturing engineers to study new 
equipment and perform risk assessment prior to any changes. 
 Every operator has the power to stop the process and all the 
equipment have e-stop. 
 They expect immediate notification and they follow the four 
Q methodology to determine route causes and they attain 
corrective action request which call it CAR (has to be made 
and track). 





Responses for the systems 
1&2 (MV Assembly, Mold 
 There are no real changes other than minor batch to batch 
changes (no big changes). 
 They use temp agencies then interview the people are sent to 
them. They look for hands on skills 
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build up/ Casting)  
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 No set training time. They start from easier and safer jobs 
then progress on harder job.  
 No high turnover for his areas. 
 They rejected for static issues and test parameters. 
 Most common reason is partial discharge (the reason is 
unknown) 
 Not a lot of repetitive motion. Heavy lifting is the only big 
risk 
 EHS review new equipment and it has to be approved by 
multiple people prior to any changes (the name of it is 
“change in process”) 
 He and all the employees have the power to stop the process 
 Manage the unexpected situations: is based on severity and 
the area of the job. Usually EHS and engineering handle the 
situation. 





Responses for the systems 
3&4 (Cutouts Pre and Final 
Assembly)  
 
With 5 years’ experience 
 No real changes. Material stored in the warehouse at 
somewhere outside of the plant 
 Goes through temp agencies. Look for fast pace team player 
 Non skilled workers: two days – skilled workers: one month 
 Turnover is very low. 
 Rejection: static and physical issues.  
 Most common: cracked porcelain. 
 Hazard: organization and housekeeping due to limited space 
(he did not mention to repetitive motion). 
 Not have to deal with potential change hazard. They manage 
through the other facility (Lake Marry in Florida) to get to 
know their needs. 
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 He and all employees have the power to stop the process 
(never for safety but quality a lot). 
 He has certain people in different departments to manage 
unexpected situations. 
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